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I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White' on June 22, 2006, it created an uber-
protected class of those workers who have complained of discrimination or
participated in some way in the resolution or investigation process of their
own or someone else's charge of discrimination. The Court's eagerly
anticipated 2 decision in White ties the hands of employers without
sufficient need and, more importantly, without sufficient basis in the
relevant statute 3 or its underlying policy goals. While protection for
whistleblowers is of utmost importance in today's workplace,4 the Court
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1. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
2. See, e.g., "Adverse Employment Action" Argument in Supreme Court,
http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2006/04/adverse-employm-l.html (Apr. 11, 2006)
(referring to White case as "the most important employment law case of the year"); Robert
Whitman & Renee Phillips, Supreme Court Clarifies Standards for Title VII Claims,
MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING (Jun. 27, 2006) (referring to Supreme Court's decision in White as
"eagerly anticipated").
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
4. See generally Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year: The
Whistleblowers, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30 (naming as persons of the year corporate
whistleblowers Sherron Watkins of Enron, Coleen Rowley of the FBI and Cynthia Cooper
of Worldcom).
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went too far in White, implementing a vague and highly subjective standard
that affords employees who complain of discrimination, whether founded
or not, what in practicality amounts to near immunity from even the
slightest changes in working conditions. Indeed, after the Court's decision
in White, an employer must treat an employee who has engaged in any
activity protected by Title VII with kid gloves and must be far more careful
about its interaction with any such employee than it must be as to those
workers in the minority groups Title VII was originally enacted to protect.
This Article will explain how the Court's decision in White goes too
far in protecting employees who complain of discrimination under Title
VII, both as a matter of statutory interpretation and as a matter of policy.
In Part II, I will frame the issue by comparing and contrasting the two most
relevant statutory provisions and highlighting the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court that bear on their interpretation. In Part III, I will
expose the issue as it arose in a split among the federal circuit courts of
appeals and as it came to the Supreme Court in White, and in Part IV I will
discuss the Supreme Court's decision in the White case itself. In Part V, I
will explain the practical and legal ramifications of the White decision, and,
finally, I propose in Part VI that Congress intervenes to fix the problems
the decision creates.
II. THE SOURCE OF THE CONFLICT: Two SIMILAR BUT DISTINCT
STATUTORY PROVISIONS, AND THE SUPREME COURT'S LIMITED
INTERPRETIVE INPUT.
A. An Exercise in Comparison and Contrast: The Relevant Statutory
Provisions
When Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
forty-three years ago, it sought to combat one of the biggest social
problems of that era-rampant discrimination against minorities in the
workplace.' In order to effectuate this purpose, Congress made it:
5. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) ("The
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment
opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have
fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.");
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("The objective of Congress in the
enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees."); H.R. REP. No. 88-914
(1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2391 ("The bill, as amended, is designed
primarily to protect and provide more effective means to enforce the civil rights of persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States.").
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an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
This core substantive statutory provision was intended to prohibit
employers from treating employees differently from one another because of
such employees' protected trait or traits.7 Title VII does not, however, tout
as its primary goal redress of the harms that might be brought about by
these banned discriminatory acts.8 Instead, the statute is intended to be
preventive in nature, and encourages employer forethought, employee
involvement in deterrence and enforcement, and conciliation before
litigation. 9 To that end, the statute not only makes it unlawful to treat
employees differently because of their race, sex, religion, and national
origin, but also prohibits "discriminat[ion] against" any employee who has
"opposed" any employment practice made unlawful by Title VII or has
"made a charge, testified, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing" under Title VII.O This section of the statute, often
referred to as the "anti-retaliation provision," thus creates an additional
protected class-i..e., an employee is protected by Title VII not only on the
basis of her "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," but also on the
basis of her status as an employee who either has complained of the sort of
discrimination prohibited by the statute or has participated in the
investigation or trial of such a claim."
Congress enacted the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII at the same
time it enacted the core substantive provision of the statute, 2 and used
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
7. Id.; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792 (explaining the purpose and
implications of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (stating the purpose of Title
VII: "It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees.").
8. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) ("Although Title
VII seeks 'to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination,' . . . its 'primary objective,' like that of any statute meant to influence
primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm." (citations omitted)).
9. Id.; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998)
(referencing "Congress' intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title
VII context ... " (citing E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984))).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
11. Id. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a); see also Sanders v. N.Y. City Hum. Res. Admin.,
361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Title VII makes an employer liable for discriminating
against its employees based on race or gender, or for retaliating against an employee for
having challenged such discrimination.").
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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similar language in both provisions. Specifically, both Section 703 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (what I refer to as the "core substantive
provision" of the statute, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) and
Section 704 (the anti-retaliation provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3)
use the terms "discriminate against" to describe the sort of action made
unlawful thereby. The term "discriminate against," however, though
employed repeatedly, is never expressly defined in the statute. Moreover,
although the Supreme Court has on several occasions spoken to the scope
and meaning of the core substantive provision more generally,' 3 it has not
(at least until this last term14) addressed specifically the scope and meaning
of the terms "discriminate against" as they appear anywhere in the statute. 15
Even absent a statutory definition or explicit Supreme Court-endorsed
interpretation, the lower courts and commentators agreed almost
unanimously that both the core substantive provision and its anti-retaliation
counterpart require plaintiff to prove some adverse action to make out a
prima facie case. That is, the circuit courts have generally agreed that the
term "discriminate against" as used in both provisions requires a plaintiff to
prove some adverse employment action by the employer. 16 This substantial
13. See infra Part lI.B. (discussing Supreme Court cases interpreting Title VII's core
substantive provision).
14. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414-16
(2006).
15. Nor does the legislative history offer clear answers. The Congressional Record
includes only a basic definition of the term "discriminate," contained in an interpretive
memorandum read into the record during a Title VII debate: "To discriminate is to make a
distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor .. "1 i0 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
16. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring
"'materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment .. ' "to support retaliation claim and quoting standard from case pertaining to
claim under anti-discrimination provision); Sanders, 361 F.3d at 755 (stating that aggrieved
employee must show "adverse employment action" to support claim under either core
substantive anti-discrimination provision or anti-retaliation provision of Title VII); James v.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 376 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that court's
own prior interpretation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, requiring "some adverse
employment action" to state cognizable claim, applied with equal force in case where
plaintiff claims discrimination under statute's core substantive provision); White v.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799-800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), reh 'g
en banc denied, Apr. 26, 2005, affd sub. nom, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (holding that term
"discriminate against" in anti-retaliation provision of Title VII should be interpreted to
require same materially adverse employment action required to support claim under core
substantive anti-discrimination provision of not only Title VII but also other federal
employment discrimination statutes like Americans With Disabilities Act); Griffin v. Potter,
356 F.3d 824, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying same "materially adverse" employment
action standard to both Title VII retaliation claim and discrimination claim under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d
528, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing Fifth Circuit precedent for proposition that anti-
discrimination provision and anti-retaliation provision of Title VII both require showing of
adverse employment action, albeit of different degrees); Heno v. Sprint/U. Mgm't Co., 208
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unanimity did not, however, translate into universal agreement. Thus,
while the courts agreed that an employee must show some adverse action
by the employer to state a prima facie case of retaliation, a heated debate
arose as to what actions by employers should suffice to satisfy the adverse-
action element. The disagreement focused on the statutory language, with
primary emphasis on the similarities and differences between the core
substantive provision of Title VII and its anti-retaliation counterpart.
Specifically, the language of the anti-retaliation provision simply declares
it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment" because any
such employee has engaged in protected activity. 7 Similarly, the core
substantive provision also labels the prohibited conduct "an unlawful
employment practice" and uses the term "discriminate against" to describe
the acts made unlawful thereby, but then goes on to include more detail-
that is, Section 703 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's [protected trait.]"'' 8  As such, the core substantive
provision describes in more detail the kind of discrimination it prohibits,
including not only refusal to hire and discharge but also other forms of
discrimination that affect the employee's "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment."' 9 By contrast, the anti-retaliation provision
includes no reference to forms of "discriminat[ion]" and instead only
makes it "an unlawful employment practice.., to discriminate." 2 0 Courts
disagreed about how to interpret these two related but distinct statutory
provisions, and the legislative history offered no guidance.2' Should courts
F.3d 847, 857 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that alleged adverse action is sufficient to support
retaliation claim under Title VII only if materially affects "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment .... " as under core substantive provision of Title VII);
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 787 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that "our
Court and others have interpreted 'discriminat[ion]' to mean conduct that falls within the
basic prohibition against employment discrimination found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)...
." and that courts thus require plaintiff to "show that he or she suffered a 'materially adverse
employment action.' " to support claim under either core substantive provision or anti-
retaliation provision); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In
order to overcome her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or
retaliation, appellant was required to show, among other things, that she suffered an adverse
employment action that affected the terms or conditions of her employment." (emphasis
added)).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
18. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
21. The legislative history of Title VII contains almost no reference to the anti-
retaliation provision. What reference it does contain amounts to nothing more than a
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treat the anti-retaliation provision's unadorned prohibition of
"discriminat[ion] against" protected individuals as shorthand for the more
detailed acts prohibited in the statute's core substantive provision? Or does
Congress's omission of the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" language from the anti-retaliation provision signal a
difference, intentional or not, in the scope of the prohibited conduct? If so,
does that difference make the anti-retaliation provision broader, such that it
encompasses more employer acts as prohibited discrimination than its sister
provision, or does the difference make the anti-retaliation provision
narrower, encompassing only the most severe employment decisions?
B. Helpful Instruction or Added Confusion?: The Supreme Court
Precedents Pertinent to the Debate
The Supreme Court has decided numerous cases under Title VII since
its enactment over 40 years ago, but has offered very little express
instruction as to the meaning of the term "discriminate against" as used
therein. Indeed, it was not until late last term that the Supreme Court
addressed the meaning of the adverse-action element in the retaliation
context at all.22 Prior to that time, the Court had, however, spoken at least
indirectly to the adversity requirement in the discrimination context.
Most of the Supreme Court's precedents instructive on the adversity
requirement involve claims of sexual harassment. Perhaps the clearest such
instruction came in the Court's 1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank v.
committee report's reiteration of part of the anti-retaliation provision without any
explanation of its meaning. H.R. Rep No. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391, 2403; Edward C. Walterscheid, A Question of Retaliation: Opposition Conduct as
Protected Expression Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 B.C. L. REv. 391,
393 (1988). Courts have therefore been left to interpret the anti-retaliation provision
without the aid of any legislative history. Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental
Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir. 1976). The court in Hochstadt described the
predicament well:
Neither in its wording nor legislative history does section 704(a) make plain
how far Congress meant to immunize hostile and disruptive employee activity
when it declared it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The statute says no
more, and the committee reports on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1963, which later became Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, repeat the language of 704(a) without any explanation. See
H.Rep.No.914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2401
(1964); H.Rep.No.570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1963). The proceedings and
floor debates over Title VII are similarly unrevealing. Courts are thus left to
develop their own interpretation of protected opposition.
Id.
22. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414-16 (2006).
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Vinson.23 The plaintiff in that case, Mechelle Vinson, claimed sexual
harassment by her supervisor, who managed the branch of defendant
Meritor Savings Bank where she worked.24 The Bank claimed that Vinson
could not prevail under Title VII because the hostile-environment
harassment she alleged resulted in no tangible or economic loss. 25 The
Court rejected the Bank's argument, holding that "the language of Title VII
is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. ' '26  Notably,
though, the Court did not base its decision on the term "discriminate
against" but instead focused on the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment," finding that it "evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment" and, therefore, is not limited solely to "economic" or
"tangible" harm.27 Thus, the Court held that a plaintiff could prevail on a
claim of sexual harassment under Title VII even without proof of any
resultant tangible or economic injury: "For sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."
28
The Court's reliance on the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" rather than the phrase "discriminate against" in Meritor
Savings Bank is not necessarily intuitive. Indeed, before the Court decided
that case, one might have readily argued that the term "discriminate
against," used to describe the conduct made unlawful under Title VII,
indicates the type and severity of harm required to support a claim, while
the phrase "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment" simply
signals that the alleged "discrimination" must somehow affect the
employment relationship. 9 Under this view, a decision that the core
substantive provision prohibits not just economic or tangible harm but also
non-economic, intangible forms of discrimination so long as they are
severe or pervasive, might have made the most sense as an interpretation of
23. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
24. Id. at 59-60.
25. Id. at 64.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 67.
29. See Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121,
115 1-53 (1998) (proposing that the phrase:
'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' emphasizes the
employment-related nature of the prohibited discrimination .... [and] is better
read as making clear that an employer who discriminates against an employee in
a non-job-related context would not run afoul of Title VII, rather than as
sheltering employment discrimination that does not significantly disadvantage
an employee.)
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the term "discriminate against." However, the Court did not take this
position. Instead, the Court relied upon Congress's use of the phrase
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" to support its conclusion
that Title VII encompasses such intangible harms. Thus, the Court's
decision in Meritor Savings Bank at least supports, if it does not stand for,
the proposition that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" as used in Title VII limits the scope of the statute to those
discriminatory actions which have either a direct (i.e., tangible or
economic) effect on the plaintiffs employment or an indirect (i.e.,
intangible or non-economic) effect but are nevertheless severe and
pervasive.
The Supreme Court has espoused this view on several occasions since
deciding Meritor Savings Bank.30  Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.31 is
illustrative. Teresa Harris, like Mechelle Vinson, claimed sexual
harassment by her supervisor-in this case the company's president.32 The
district court held that while some of the acts of harassment alleged by
Harris "'offended [Harris] and would offend the reasonable woman,' . . .
they were not 'so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris']
psychological well-being"' and accordingly were not actionable.33 The
court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a
plaintiff alleging hostile-environment harassment need not demonstrate that
the alleged conduct "seriously affect[ed] plaintiffs psychological well-
being."34 Instead, she need only show that her work environment would
reasonably be perceived, and was subjectively perceived by her, as hostile
or abusive, in order to support her claim. 3  In so holding, the Court
expressly reaffirmed its decision in Meritor Savings Bank, defining a
"hostile" or "abusive" work environment as one that "is permeated with
'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' . . . that is 'sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
30. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)
(We have repeatedly made clear that although the statute mentions specific
employment decisions with immediate consequences, the scope of the
prohibition 'is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination' .. . and that it
covers more than 'terms and conditions' in the narrow contractual sense....
Thus, in Meritor we held that sexual harassment so 'severe or pervasive' as to
'alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment' violates Title VII.);
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (reiterating Meritor
Savings Bank holding).
31. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 22.
35. Id.
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create an abusive working environment."' 3 6 Thus, the Court's decisions in
Meritor Savings Bank and Harris, read together, demonstrate that the Court
interprets Title VII's core substantive provision to provide relief not only
when an employer inflicts direct economic or tangible harm to the
employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
but also when the employer's conduct brings about only intangible, non-
economic harm that otherwise constitutes sufficiently severe or pervasive
discrimination as to alter the terms and conditions of the employee's work
environment, making it hostile or abusive.
The Court's 1998 decision in Ellerth17 focused on agency law as a
determinant of an employer's vicarious liability for sexual harassment, but
also addressed at least indirectly the severity of harm required under the
statute, leaving courts and commentators wondering about its import in
other contexts. Kimberly Ellerth claimed that her supervisor, a midlevel
manager at defendant-employer Burlington Industries, had subjected her to
constant sexual harassment.38  While much of the alleged harassment
consisted of threats to affect adversely the terms of Ellerth's employment,
none of these threats were ever carried out.3 9 Thus, the issue before the
Court in that case was "whether, under Title VII , . . , an employee who
refuses the unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet
suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the
employer without showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault
for the supervisor's action. 40 In analyzing this question, the Court first
reaffirmed the holding in Meritor Savings Bank as it is described above,
instructing "that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive
alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and ... the latter must
be severe or pervasive. 41  Turning then to the agency aspects of the
question presented, the Court held that an employer is strictly liable for
supervisory harassment that constitutes a "tangible employment action" but
may only be held responsible for supervisor misconduct short of that
standard if the employer was negligent.42 Most significant here is the
Court's "import[ation]" of the "tangible employment action" concept from
circuit court cases defining the adverse action element of a Title VII
discrimination claim to mark the dividing line between conduct for which
employers are strictly liable and conduct for which an affirmative defense
36. Id. at 21.
37. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
38. Id. at 747-48.
39. Id. at 751.
40. Id. at 746 -47.
41. Id. at 752; see also id. at 754 (stating that a claim of hostile-work-environment
harassment, i.e. one involving only unfulfilled threats as opposed to threats carried out,
"requires a showing of severe or pervasive conduct").
42. Id. at 765.
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may be available. The Court stated: "A tangible employment action
constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. ' '43
Thus, under Ellerth, an employer whose supervisory employee engages in
harassment that falls short of a tangible employment action may avoid
liability upon showing that it had in place adequate anti-harassment
policies and complaint procedures that the employee unreasonably failed to
invoke. Meanwhile, the employer whose supervisor's harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action is liable for that misconduct
without regard to any care it may have taken to avoid such harms. 44
Notably, though, while the Court expressly relied upon the circuit courts'
definition of adverse action for claims under the core substantive provision,
it did not adopt or even endorse that definition for the purpose it served in
those cases.45  As such, the significance of the Court's "import[ation]" of
that definition was left open for debate among the lower courts and
commentators.46 It was not until its decision in White that the Court offered
its own view of that matter.47
43. Id. at 761.
44. Id. at 765.
45. Id. at 761.
46. Courts and commentators alike eagerly engaged in this debate. See, e.g., Boone v.
Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Ellerth as controlling standard of liability
for retaliation claims); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of "Adverse
Employment Action " in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation
Claims: What Should be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REv. 623, 624 (2003)
(criticizing lower courts for "indiscriminately borrow[ing] from" Ellerth to define adverse
employment action); Scott Rosenberg & Jeffrey Lipman, Developing a Consistent Standard
for Evaluating a Retaliation Case Under Federal and State Civil Rights Statutes and State
Common Law Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 359, 414-16
(2005) (suggesting that courts nationwide adopt adverse action standard modeled after
Supreme Court's definition of "tangible employment action" in Ellerth); Joan M. Savage,
Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse Employment Action Prong
in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation, 46 B.C. L. REv. 215, 246-47 (2004)
(proposing that EEOC's deterrence-based adverse action standard is "most logical" in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Ellerth); White, supra note 29, at 1157 ("Read in full,
the distinction drawn in [Ellerth] is not between adverse action by a supervisor that is
sufficiently material and that which is not, but between employment decisions that can be
made only by supervisors and workplace harassment that can be engaged in by supervisors
and co-workers alike.").
47. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2413 (2006) (limiting
Ellerth's discussion of "tangible employment actions" to providing a dividing line between
hostile-environment harassment cases in which employer is liable for supervisor acts with
and without affirmative defense and stating unequivocally that "Ellerth did not discuss the
scope of the general anti-discrimination provision ... [a]nd ... did not mention Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision at all"); see infra notes 185-187 and accompanying text
(discussing Court's dismissal of Ellerth as authoritative precedent in deciding White).
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The Court's decision during that same term in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc. 41 was among the few cases to address more directly
the meaning of the term "discriminate" under Title VII. The male plaintiff
in Oncale alleged sexual harassment by his male supervisors and co-
workers. 49 The district and circuit courts agreed that Title VII did not
support a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment, but the Supreme
Court reversed. ° As in Ellerth, the Court here likewise turned first to
Meritor Savings Bank and Harris as precedents defining the contours of
actionable misconduct under Title VII 1 The focus there, as before, was on
Congress's use of the words "terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment" in the statute's core substantive provision, and the Court
recognized again that those words do not limit the scope of the statute to
those employer acts that affect "'terms' and 'conditions' in the narrow
contractual sense, but [that they instead] 'evince[] a congressional intent to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment.' 5 2  The Court did not, however, limit its focus to that
particular statutory language when it went about justifying its holding that
Title VII reaches claims of same-sex harassment. This time, the Court also
relied on Congress's use of the term "discriminate" to define the prohibited
conduct: "Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in
the workplace; it is directed only at 'discriminat[ion] . . .because of...
sex . . . .' The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.,
53
Plaintiff "must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely
tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted
'discriminat[ion] .. .because of . . .sex."'54 These assertions do not
answer all the questions, but they offer at least two hints as to what the
Court thinks Congress meant by the term "discriminate" in Title VII: (1)
such "discriminat[ion]" may occur when an employer subjects certain
protected-class individuals to terms and conditions of employment that are
"disadvantageous" compared to treatment afforded to others; and (2)
employer conduct that is "merely tinged with offensive ... connotations"
related to the employee's protected trait does not constitute actionable
"discriminat[ion]."
48. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
49. Id. at 77.
50. Id. at 77, 82.
51. Id. at78.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 80 (emphasis and alteration in original).
54. Id. at 81 (emphasis and alteration in original).
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The Court had also referenced briefly the meaning of the term
"discriminate" under Title VII nearly ten years earlier in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, though without substantial clarification." There, the court
quoted an interpretive memorandum entered into the Congressional Record
at the time of Title VII's enactment.5 6 The memorandum defined the term
"discriminate" generally: "To discriminate is to make a distinction, to
make a difference in treatment or favor."57
Until it decided White, the Court never came any closer to defining the
term "discriminate against" as used in Title VII other than these less-than-
lucid assertions in Price Waterhouse and Oncale. Moreover, the
instruction the Court did provide pertained specifically to the core
substantive provision, not the anti-retaliation provision, further fostering
uncertainty as to the latter provision's meaning and scope. Thus, the lower
courts were left to interpret on their own what Congress intended. Their
tools were limited to the statutory language itself, the sparse Supreme
Court authorities on point, and their assessments of legislative policy based
on these sources.
III. THE CONFLICT DEVELOPS: A THREE-WAY (OR MORE) CIRCUIT SPLIT
Questions about the scope of the anti-retaliation provision, in the
absence of any instruction from the Supreme Court, led the lower courts
into great dissension and the federal circuit courts of appeals into a three-
way split. At one end of the spectrum, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
interpreted the anti-retaliation provision as narrower than the statute's core
substantive provision, and required plaintiffs to show an "ultimate
employment action," such as "'hiring, granting leave, discharging,
promoting, and compensating., 5 8  At the other end of the spectrum, the
Ninth Circuit read the difference in language to make the anti-retaliation
provision broader, and therefore the court required only that the plaintiff
show an action "reasonably likely to deter" protected activity.5 9 Finally,
55. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
56. Id. at 243-44.
57. Id. at 244 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964)).
58. Banks v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003); see
also, Okruhlik v. University of Arkansas, 395 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming judgment
as matter of law for employer on grounds no adverse employment action shown because
denial of tenure was not final decision and so not an "ultimate act" of employer); Hernandez
v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 2003) ("'Our court has
analyzed the 'adverse employment action' element in a stricter sense than some other
circuits.' . . . In the Fifth Circuit, only an 'ultimate employment decision' by an employer
can form the basis for liability for retaliation under Title VII." (citing Mattern v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997))).
59. See, e.g. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n adverse
employment action is adverse treatment that is reasonably likely to deter employees from
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the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits, reading the provisions together, adopted variants on a middle-
ground "materially adverse action" standard.60  The split engendered
significant debate; indeed, it received substantial attention from
commentators.6'
engaging in protected activity.")
60. See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2005) (indicating
that the term "discriminate" should carry the same meaning in anti-retaliation provision as
in the anti-discrimination provision of Title VII and requiring some evidence of severe or
pervasive harassment to support adverse-action element of retaliation claim); Fairbrother v.
Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) ("An adverse employment action is a 'materially
adverse change' in the terms and conditions of employment."); Moser v. Indiana Dep't of
Corrections, 406 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 2005) (indicating that only those employer actions
meeting a threshold level of materiality may support retaliation claim); Medina v. Income
Support Div., 431 F.3d 1131, 1136 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[T]o constitute an adverse action, the
employer's conduct must be 'materially adverse' to the employee's job status."); Griffin v.
Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2004) ("An adverse employment action must be
materially adverse, not merely an inconvenience or a change in job responsibilities .... An
adverse employment action is one that significantly alters the terms and conditions of the
employee's job"); Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 617 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (stating
that non-ultimate employment decisions are actionable only if "meet some threshold level of
substantiality," defined as " 'objectively serious and tangible enough' to alter [the
employee's] 'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'); Marrero v.
Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (setting threshold as "materially
adverse employment action"); Ford v. General Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir.
2002) ("With respect to the third element of the prima facie case, the adverse employment
action must be 'materially adverse' for the plaintiff to succeed on a Title VII claim."); Von
Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) ("What is necessary in all § 2000e-3
retaliation cases is evidence that the challenged discriminatory acts or harassment adversely
effected 'the terms, conditions, or benefits' of the plaintiff's employment."); Robinson v.
City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that employee cannot
establish retaliation claim without evidence that employer's actions altered employee's
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment).
61. See, e.g., Linda M. Glover, Title VII Section 704(a) Retaliation Claims: Turning a
Blind Eye Toward Justice, 38 Hous. L. REv. 577, 579 (2001) (arguing that the "disarray in
precedent stems from inconsistent statutory interpretation and inappropriate application of
the prima facie elements" of a retaliation claim); Levinson, supra note 46 (noting that the
circuits are divided as to the amount of harm that plaintiffs must show in order to state a
claim of disparate treatment and retaliation); Brian A. Riddell & Richard A. Bales, Adverse
Employment Action in Retaliation Cases, 34 U. BALT. L: REv. 313 (2005) (arguing that the
circuit courts of appeals should adopt an expansive approach in determining what
constitutes adverse employment action); Rosenberg & Lipman, supra note 46 (describing
that what constitutes actionable retaliation in an employment case varies from circuit to
circuit); Savage, supra note 46 (pointing out that the circuits are divided on the issue of the
types of acts give rise to a prima facie case of retaliation).
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A. The "Ultimate Employment Decision" Standard: The Fifth and
Eighth Circuits
The approach taken by the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals
was perhaps most extreme. In these circuits, an employee could establish a
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII only by showing that the
employer made an "ultimate employment decision" with respect to the
employee's job.62 To be sure, this standard set the bar quite high:
An employment action that 'does not affect job duties,
compensation, or benefits' is not an adverse employment action
under Title VII.... Only 'ultimate employment decisions such as
hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
compensating' satisfy the adverse employment action element...
[A] decision made by an employer that only limits an
employee's opportunities for promotion or lateral transfer does
not qualify as an adverse employment action under Title VII.
63
This exacting standard precluded employee-plaintiffs from recovering
in many cases alleging a wide range of employer decisions as adverse,
including hostile treatment by supervisors and/or co-workers; 64 job
transfers or duty changes described as "purely lateral," even though these
changes might involve work in a dirtier or otherwise less desirable position
or location;65 implementation of new job requirements that prevented
62. Hockman v. Westward Comms., LLC, 122 Fed. Appx. 734 (5th Cir. 2004);
Hernandez, 321 F.3d at 531.
63. Banks v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003).
64. Hockman, 122 Fed. Appx. at 748; Henthom v. Capitol Comms., Inc., 359 F.3d
1021, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 2004).
65. Henthorn, 359 F.3d at 1028-29.; see also Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142,
1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant-employer on
grounds that plaintiff failed to show adverse employment action based on claim regarding
the replacement of employees whom she supervised with different employees in the
equivalent job classification, because such an employment change involved "only minor
changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits"). Notably, the Eighth
Circuit was not entirely uniform in its approach; indeed, this circuit issued several decisions
that appeared to weaken the ultimate-employment-decision standard announced in
Ledergerber. See, e.g., Henthorn, 359 F.3d at 1028 (omitting any reference to "ultimate"
employment actions and instead purporting to require only a "material change in
employment" with a direct effect on the employee's " 'salary, benefits, or
responsibilities"'); Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 829-30 (8th Cir. 2004)
(upholding claim even though alleged adverse acts had no direct impact on plaintiff's
compensation, benefits or employment status); Spears v. Miss. Dep't of Corr. & Human
Res., 210 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding, without reference to "ultimate" employment
action, that allegations of transfer from one facility to another with no other change in pay
or benefits and of downward alteration of performance evaluation failed to support
actionable retaliation claim because the employment change involved only minor changes in
working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits and the job evaluation was not used
to her detriment); Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 1999)
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plaintiffs from receiving pay increases or promotions; 66 and denial of
professorial tenure when avenues of appeal remained available.67 In short,
these circuits required a final, decisive act directly affecting the employee's
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment in order to
support a retaliation claim; "mediate" or "interlocutory" decisions 68 with
only indirect adverse effects would not suffice.
B. The "Reasonably-Likely-to-Deter" Standard: The Ninth Circuit and
the EEOC
At the opposing end of the spectrum from the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits was the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That
court held in Ray v. Henderson that "an action is cognizable as an adverse
employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from
engaging in protected activity., 69 In Ray, the plaintiff-employee claimed
retaliation based on employer decisions that affected the terms and
(affirming summary judgment in favor of employer on employee's retaliation claim based
on negative performance evaluation because "[a]t most, the evaluation resulted in a loss of
status or prestige without any material change in [plaintiff's] salary, position, or duties").
The court did not, however, explicitly overrule its ultimate-employment decision precedent,
and in 2005, the court again appeared to demand the higher level of adversity sanctioned
under the ultimate-employment-decision standard. Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 395 F.3d 872,
879-881 (8
th Cir. 2005) (finding insufficient to support retaliation claim tenure-track
professor's allegations that she was denied tenure because avenues of appeal were still
available to her and "each decision along the way is not actionable. Only the final decision
is the ultimate act"). Moreover, most courts and commentators agree that the Eighth Circuit
applied the same "ultimate-employment-decision" standard that the Fifth Circuit
implemented, even though the court was not always so explicit in applying it. See, e.g.
White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799-800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en
banc), reh'g en banc denied Apr. 26, 2005, ajfd sub. nom, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (stating
that Fifth and Eighth Circuits applied "ultimate employment decision" standard); Ray v.
Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240-41 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[t]he most restrictive view
of adverse employment actions is held by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits."); Wideman v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (1 1h Cir. 1998) (noting that "the Eighth Circuit has
sided with the Fifth Circuit" in requiring "ultimate employment decision" to support
retaliation claim); Riddell & Bales, supra note 61, at 316-17 (asserting that "[t]he Fifth and
Eighth Circuits take the restrictive approach, holding that only ultimate employment
decisions... constitute actionable adverse employment actions."); Savage, supra note 46, at
216 (noting that Fifth and Eighth Circuits both follow ultimate-employment-decision
standard). But see White, 364 F.3d at 801 (stating that "while the Eighth Circuit has
ostensibly adopted the 'ultimate employment decision' standard, it has consistently applied
a broader standard."); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 864 (4th Cir. 2001) (arguing
the same); Rosenberg & Lipman, supra note 46, at 381-84 (2005) (describing the Eighth
Circuit's test as requiring only material adversity, not ultimate employment action).
66. Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2003).
67. Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 395 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2005).
68. Banks, 320 F.3d at 578; Okruhlik, 395 F.3d at 879.
69. 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).
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conditions of his employment both indirectly and directly to varying
degrees. 70 The court concluded that all of the employer actions alleged by
plaintiff qualified as sufficiently adverse to support a claim of retaliation:
"[t]he actions decreased [plaintiffs] pay, decreased the amount of time that
he had to complete the same amount of work, and decreased his ability to
influence workplace policy, and thus were reasonably likely to deter
[plaintiff] or other employees from complaining about discrimination in the
workplace.' While an employer action that decreases the employee's
compensation would often also qualify under the stricter "ultimate
employment decision" standard, most of the other actions alleged by the
plaintiff in Ray would likely have been dismissed by a court in the Fifth or
Eighth Circuits as insufficient to support a retaliation claim. In this respect,
then, the Ninth Circuit's "reasonably likely to deter" standard was
substantially broader than that followed in its sister circuits, circuits which
required an "ultimate" act to support a claim.
The EEOC also endorsed the "reasonably-likely-to-deter" standard as
it was adopted by the Ninth Circuit. The most recent version of the EEOC
Compliance Manual addressed to retaliation, published in 1998, states that
"[t]he statutory retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment that is
based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging
party or others from engaging in protected activity. 72  In support of its
position, the EEOC cites to both the "statutory language" and "policy
considerations. 73  With respect to the former, the EEOC states that the
language of the anti-retaliation provision is broader than the core
substantive provision of the statute; this is because it does not purport to
limit its coverage to those employer acts that affect the "terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment. 7 4  As to the latter-the policy
considerations-the EEOC contends that its interpretation "accords with
the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provision, which is to
'[m]aintain[] unfettered access to [the] statutory remedial mechanisms,' ,71
by providing broad protection for employees who would or do in fact
70. Id. at 1237-39.
71. Id. at 1244.
72. 2 OFFICE OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS, U.S. E.E.O.C., E.E.O.C. COMPLIANCE MANUAL
8005, at 6512 (May 20, 1998) (hereinafter E.E.O.C. COMPLIANCE MANUAL).
73. Id.
74. Id.; compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (making it unlawful to "discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin") with
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting any employer from "discriminat[ing] against" any
employee who has engaged in protected activity); see also supra Part II.A. (comparing and
contrasting core substantive provision of Title VII with anti-retaliation provision).
75. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346
(1997)).
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complain about discrimination so that the public interest in enforcing the
statute is promoted.76
The EEOC has not always endorsed this broad approach, though.
Indeed, it was not until 1998, when the EEOC introduced its latest
interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, that it advocated
this "reasonably-likely-to-deter" standard. Prior to that time, the EEOC
took the position that proof of a claim under the anti-retaliation provision
should be made the same way a claim under the core substantive provision
of the statute is established-that is, by showing that "the [employer] took
some sort of adverse employment-related action against him."' 77 Thus, the
EEOC endorsed a narrower interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision
of the statute, in line with its interpretation of the core substantive
provision. This interpretation remained intact for the first 34 years of the
statute's existence; its broader interpretation has only been in effect for the
last eight years.
C. The "Material-Adverse-Action "Standard: The Middle Ground
Majority Approach
Occupying much of the expanse between the opposite positions taken
by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, on one hand, and the Ninth Circuit and
EEOC, on the other, were the remaining nine circuit courts of appeals. In
those circuits, some threshold level of materiality was required before an
employer action could support a retaliation claim under Title VII. But
while these circuits agreed that the employer's action against the employee
must meet a threshold level of materiality, the application of this standard
varied some from circuit to circuit and case to case; indeed, the application
of this standard even engendered conflict as to how exactly to define the
circuit split itself.7" Most notably, the variations arose as to two distinct
issues: (1) what degree of "materiality" was required; and (2) whether the
76. Id.
77. 2 OFFICE OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS, U.S. E.E.O.C., E.E.O.C. COMPLIANCE MANUAL
§ 614.1(d) (Jan. 1998); 2 E.E.O.C. COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 614.3(a) (Mar. 1988).
78. Compare Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the
First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits "define adverse employment action
broadly" while the Second and Third Circuits hold "an intermediate position" and placing
itself within the "majority" in adopting ultimate-employment-decision standard), with White
v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799-800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc),
reh 'g en banc denied Apr. 26, 2005, affd sub. nom, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (characterizing
Seventh Circuit's position as most closely aligned with that of Ninth Circuit and EEOC); see
generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
2005 WL 2055901, at * 10 ("The chaos [surrounding the circuit split] is such that courts and
commentators even disagree about how to characterize the various courts of appeals'
positions within the circuit split."); 2 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §
34.04 [1]-[4] (MB 2d ed. 2006).
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action must have had some adverse impact on a "term, condition, or
privilege" of employment, as required under the core substantive provision
of Title VII.
1. The Degree of Materiality Required
The nine courts of appeals falling in this middle ground all stated the
relevant adverse-action standard with substantial similarity. That is, the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and District
of Columbia Circuits all required some "materially adverse" effect on the
employee or her employment in order to state a claim for retaliation.7 9 In
the majority of cases decided under this standard--cases which arose in
varying factual and legal contexts-the court affirmed judgment as a matter
of law in favor of the defendant employer on plaintiffs retaliation claim,
either at the summary judgment stage or at trial. For example, courts in the
First, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have all upheld judgments
for the defendant on plaintiff's claims of varying forms of retaliatory
harassment.8° Likewise, the First, Second, Fourth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits
79. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Fairbrother v.
Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that "[a]n adverse employment action is a
'materially adverse change' in the terms and conditions of employment."(quoting Blackie
v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 725 (1st Cir.1996))); Medina v. Income Support Division, 413 F.3d
1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that actionable adverse action "must be 'materially
adverse' to the employee's job status," and that such a claim is to be determined on a "case-
to-case basis" and "does not include 'a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job
responsibilities'."); Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2004) ("An adverse
employment action must be materially adverse, not merely an inconvenience or a change in
job responsibilities."); Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 23 (1 st Cir. 2002)
("Work places are rarely idyllic retreats, and the mere fact that an employee is displeased by
an employer's act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a
materially adverse employment action."); Ford v. General Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 553
(6
th Cir. 2002) ("With respect to the third element of the prima facie case, the adverse
employment action must be 'materially adverse' for the plaintiff to succeed on a Title VII
claim."); Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002)
(applying adverse-action standard from Title VII discrimination case, whereby employee
must show "serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" to establish an actionable claim); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866
(4th Cir. 2001) (stating that alleged adverse employment action must have "significant"
effect on " 'terms, conditions, or benefits' of the plaintiff's employment" to support claim);
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1998) (drawing upon Title
VII cases and requiring "materially adverse employment action" to support retaliation
claim).
80. Jones v. D.C. Dep't of Corr., 429 F.3d 276, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Medina, 413 F.3d
at 1135; Griffin, 356 F.3d at 829; Marrero, 304 F.3d at 23; Parkins v. Civil Constructors of
Ill., Inc., 359 F.3d 1021, 1029 (7th Cir. 1998); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d
1253, 1265 (10 th Cir. 1998); Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 867; Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N.
Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
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have all affirmed defense judgments against claims by plaintiffs arising out
of job reassignments or transfers.8 '
On the other hand, many of these courts have also found that certain
actions, similar in many respects to those deemed insufficiently material in
some cases, were sufficient to allow the retaliation claim to reach the jury
in others. For example, while the plaintiffs inter-department transfer and
her employer's tolerance of co-worker harassment were held by the First
Circuit to be insufficient to support plaintiffs retaliation claim in Marrero
v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc. ,82 that court found the co-worker harassment
experienced by the plaintiff in Noviello v. City of Boston83 sufficient to
allow her claim to go to a jury. Similarly, while the plaintiff's transfer to a
"floater" position and poor performance review were found insufficiently
material by the Second Circuit in Fairbrother v. Morrison, the plaintiffs
reassignment involving different responsibilities and greater contact with
the prisoner population, coupled with harassment by her co-workers and
supervisors, was upheld by that court as sufficient to allow plaintiffs
retaliation claim to reach a jury in Richardson v. NY State Department of
Correctional Services.84  The D.C. Circuit held that plaintiffs allegations
of verbal harassment, a change in her work shift, and her transfer to a
different jobsite with less desirable conditions were not actionable in Jones
v. D.C. Department of Corrections,85 but the same court reversed the
employer's summary judgment on plaintiffs claim of reduced
responsibilities over a period of years in Holcomb v. Powell.86 Thus, while
each of these courts applied the same general standard-requiring some
material adverse change in the plaintiffs employment to support an
actionable retaliation claim-the application of this standard led to varying
results. Of course, these varying results can in many cases be attributed to
distinct differences in the factual contexts in which they arose. Indeed,
such variations are at least to be expected and are perhaps even inevitable.
Thus, even in those courts that applied a mostly uniform standard, the
results often could not be predicted with any substantial degree of
accuracy. Significantly, though, the material adversity standard offers at
least the opportunity for an objective approach that allows employers and
courts alike to administer the law with some predictability while
simultaneously still permitting the inevitably varying contexts to receive
the attention they deserve.
81. Jones, 429 F.3d at 280; Fairbrother, 412 F.3d at 56; Tran v. Trs. of the State Colls.
in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2004); Marrero, 304 F.3d at 23; Von Gunten, 243
F.3d at 868; Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1999).
82. 304 F.3d at 26-27.
83. 398 F.3d 76, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2005).
84. 180 F.3d 426, 444-46 (2d Cir. 1999).
85. 429 F.3d at 280.
86. 433 F.3d at 902.
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2. The Extent to Which the Action Must Be Employment-Related
A related sub-issue also cropped up in some retaliation cases heard in
these "middle-ground" circuits. That is, while most claims of retaliation
were based upon alleged adverse actions related directly to the plaintiffs
employment, some plaintiffs claimed forms of retaliation occurring outside
the workplace. For example, in Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, the plaintiff,
a former employee of Chevrolet, claimed that after he mentioned he might
file an EEOC charge, a manager at defendant Stevinson Chevrolet initiated
a criminal complaint with the sheriffs office, alleging that the plaintiff had
committed forgery. 7 The trial court awarded plaintiff $265,000 on his
retaliation claim, as compensation for the "'extreme emotional distress,
suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, loss of reputation, standing in the
community . . .he experienced as a proximate result of [his employer's]
retaliation,' as well as for the legal fees he incurred in defending himself
against the theft and forgery charges.""8  On appeal, the
defendant/employer argued that Title VII does not reach the reporting of a
suspected crime because such activity, having little or nothing to do with
the plaintiffs employment, cannot constitute an "unlawful employment
practice" as a matter of law.8 9 The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's
argument, holding that "malicious prosecution can constitute adverse
employment action," and reasoning that because Title VII is remedial in
nature, it should be "liberally construed" to include not only former
employees9" (as held in other Tenth Circuit precedent at the time, and
confirmed shortly thereafter by the United States Supreme Court in
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.9 ), but also extra-employment acts. 9 Further, the
Tenth Circuit also reasoned that retaliatory prosecution bears a connection
to present or future employment, in that a criminal trial "is necessarily
public and therefore carries a significant risk of humiliation, damage to
reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment prospects.,
93
Thus, while the Tenth Circuit has consistently required a retaliation
plaintiff to allege an action "'materially adverse' to the employee's job
status . . . such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits, '94 the court, in what appears to still be good law, 95 also
87. 74 F.3d 980, 984 ( 10 th Cir. 1996).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 986.
90. Id.
91. 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
92. Berry, 74 F.3d at 986.
93. Id.
94. Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1136 (10th Cir. 2005).
95. But cf Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005)
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did not hesitate to extend the reach of the anti-retaliation provision to
action only indirectly related to the plaintiff's job.
The District of Columbia Circuit has similarly concluded that the
adverse action alleged in support of a retaliation claim under Title VII need
not bear a direct relationship to the plaintiffs employment status. In
Rochon v. Gonzales, the plaintiff claimed that his employer, the Federal
Bureau of Investigations ("FBI"), retaliated against him for filing a Title
VII lawsuit by refusing to investigate a death threat made by a federal
prisoner.96 The court held that an employer action that would be "material
to a reasonable employee" such that it "well might have 'dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination"'
is sufficient to support a retaliation claim, without regard to "whether the
alleged retaliatory act is related to the plaintiffs employment. 97  Thus,
plaintiffs claim that the FBI failed or refused to investigate a death threat
against him, albeit only peripherally related to his employment, was
sufficient to state an actionable retaliation claim.98
What is perhaps most striking about these decisions is their
implication for the statutory construction question raised by the circuit
split. That is, if the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII was intended to
be interpreted in the same manner as the statute's core substantive
provision, then those courts extending the reach of the former to acts
outside the employment relationship have misapplied the statute. As
discussed in more detail in Part II.A. of this Article, the core substantive
provision of Title VII expressly limits its applicability to those employer
actions that discriminate against the employee "with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."99 The anti-
retaliation provision includes no such express limitation.00 Thus, whether
Congress intended the anti-retaliation provision of the statute to incorporate
those same limitations or not should determine whether it extends to
actions that affect the employee only outside the workplace. The Supreme
Court answered this question in White, but, as discussed in Part VI below,
its decision likely warrants some congressional intervention.' 1
(distinguishing Berry on the grounds that charges against plaintiff had not led to trial and
thus she did not suffer same public humiliation and "concomitant harm to future
employment prospects" as the plaintiff in Berry).
96. 438 F.3d 1211, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
97. Id. at 1219.
98. Id. at 1219-20.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
100. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
101. See infra Section VI (discussing need for Congress to amend Title VII in light of
Supreme Court's decision in White).
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D. The Middle-Ground Majority Approach in Action: The Decisions of
the Lower Courts in White
The decisions of the district and circuit courts in the White case
exemplify the varying results that can flow from application of the middle-
ground standard and demonstrate the need for clearer instruction as to how
the law should apply.
1. The Events Leading to White's Lawsuit and Disposition at the
Trial Court
The Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. ("Burlington"), a
railroad operator in Tennessee, hired Sheila White in June 1997 to work in
the Maintenance of Way Department as a "track laborer. 0 02 This position
involved a myriad of duties including moving track components and
material, clearing brush, and removing litter and spilled cargo from the
right-of-way. °3  The Burlington supervisor who interviewed White
expressed interest in her previous experience operating forklifts, and when
the department's forklift operator took a different position shortly after
White came to work there, Burlington assigned White to operate the
forklift as her primary duty.'04 White continued to operate the forklift, in
addition to performing some of the other track laborer tasks, for
approximately three months.° 5 In September 1997, White complained to
Burlington management that her immediate supervisor had made
inappropriate remarks to her in front of her all-male colleagues, including a
suggestion that women should not work in the Maintenance of Way
Department. 0 6  After conducting an internal investigation, Burlington
suspended White's supervisor for ten days and required him to attend a
sexual-harassment training session.107 At approximately the same time,
Burlington reassigned White to perform only "standard track laborer
tasks." 108 Burlington explained to her that co-workers had complained that
White, the only female and a relatively new employee, was receiving
preferential treatment because of her sex in that she was assigned the "'less
arduous and cleaner job' of forklift operator."'"
102. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id; see also White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 310 F.3d 443, 447 (6th Cir.
2002), rev'd en banc 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004), affd sub. nom 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006)
("White P') (discussing co-worker complaints).
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White filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on October 10,
1997, claiming that her reassignment to standard track laborer duties
constituted unlawful sex discrimination and retaliation for her complaint
about her supervisor's harassment."10 She filed a second EEOC charge in
December, claiming that Burlington's managers had placed her under
surveillance and were scrutinizing her daily activities."1  Shortly after
Burlington received the second charge, White and her immediate
supervisor had a disagreement, which led her supervisor to report White to
management as insubordinate and place her on immediate suspension
without pay."2 Pursuant to the internal grievance procedures provided in
the company's collective bargaining agreement, Burlington conducted an
internal investigation. The company concluded, after 37 days, that the
suspension was unwarranted because White had not in fact been
insubordinate." 3 Thus, Burlington reinstated White with back pay for the
37 days of her suspension." 4 She then filed an additional EEOC charge
alleging retaliation based on the suspension."s
White subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Western District of
Tennessee based on these events, claiming that Burlington discriminated
against her on the basis of her sex and retaliated against her for
complaining about alleged sex discrimination. Specifically, she alleged
that Burlington unlawfully reassigned her from forklift operator duties to
standard track laborer tasks and suspended her without pay for 37 days." 6
The case was tried in front of a jury from August 29, 2000 until September
5, 2000. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict in
Burlington's favor on White's sex discrimination claim but in White's
favor on her retaliation claim, awarding $43,500 in compensatory damages,
including $3,250 in medical expenses incurred to treat alleged emotional
distress during her suspension.' 7 Burlington then filed a renewed motion
for judgment as a matter of law on White's retaliation claim, which the
court denied, and Burlington sought timely appeal.'
2. Reversal by a Three-Judge Panel of the Sixth Circuit
In White I, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of Burlington's motion
110. White!, 310 F.3d. at-448.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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for judgment as a matter of law on November 13, 2002."9 Explaining the
applicable standard, the court stated:
[A] plaintiff must identify a materially adverse change in the
terms and conditions of his employment to state a claim for
retaliation under Title VII. . . . A material adverse change
includes a termination in employment, a demotion evidenced by
a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material
loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities,
or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation....
Importantly, a change in employment conditions 'must be more
disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job
responsibilities.' 120
The court then proceeded to address the two actions alleged by White as
adverse, concluding in turn that each failed to satisfy the requisite
standard. 121 First, as to White's reassignment from forklift duties to
standard track-laborer tasks, the court found that she suffered no reduction
in pay or benefits and was given neither significantly diminished material
responsibilities nor a less prestigious job title.' 2 As such, her reassignment
constituted a non-actionable "lateral transfer," at most.123 Moreover, the
court rejected White's contention that her reassignment could support a
retaliation claim because the standard track laborer tasks were more
"physically demanding" than operating a forklift:
The fact that forklift duty is less physically demanding than track
maintenance work does not make White's reassignment a
cognizable adverse employment action. The railroad hired White
as a track maintenance worker. One of her explicit job
responsibilities was to maintain the railroad tracks. We fail to
see how White suffered an adverse employment action by being
directed to do a job duty for which Burlington Northern hired
her. 1
2 4
The court likewise concluded that White's temporary suspension
followed by a reinstatement with back pay failed to rise to the level of a
cognizable material adverse employment action. Here, the court relied
heavily on its conclusion that the suspension was not the employer's final
act but rather was only an intermediate step in its decision-making
process.'25  The court cited its own precedent, in which a university
119. Id. at443.
120. Id. at 450 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at450-51.
122. Id. at451.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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professor's retaliation claim was rejected where the initial denial of her
application for tenure was subsequently reversed through an internal
grievance process and she was awarded tenure with full back pay and
benefits to the date tenure was initially denied. The court concluded that
White likewise suffered no "final or lasting adverse employment action"
sufficient to support her claim.'26 Notably, the court here departed from its
own precedent and applied the more exacting "ultimate employment
decision" standard in this part of the opinion.'27 Indeed, rather than citing
any of its own precedents in support of its conclusions, the court instead
cited to Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 2' the seminal Fifth Circuit case
adopting the ultimate-employment-decision standard. 129  Prior to its
decision in White I, however, the court had repeatedly required only that
plaintiff show a materially adverse employment action to support a
retaliation claim.'3 ° It had only applied the higher threshold of an ultimate
employment decision in a few cases, most of which did not include claims
under the anti-retaliation provision but instead asserted claims of
discrimination.'
31
3. The Sixth Circuit's En Banc Decision Affirming the Trial Court.
Perhaps because of this departure from Sixth Circuit precedent,
perhaps because of the circuit split, or perhaps for some other reason, the
Sixth Circuit granted plaintiff rehearing en banc, vacating the panel's
decision in White L.132 Contrary to the result reached by the panel in White
I, on April 14, 2004, the en banc court affirmed the trial court's denial of
126. Id. (discussing Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th
Cir. 1999)).
127. Id.
128. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
129. WhiteI,310F.3dat451.
130. See, e.g., Ford v. General Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2002) ("With
respect to the third element of the prima facie case, the adverse employment action must be
"materially adverse" for the plaintiff to succeed on a Title VII claim."); Hollins v. Atlantic
Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[A] plaintiff must identify a materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of his employment to state a claim for retaliation under
Title VII ....").
131. See, e.g., Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir.
1999) (holding, in Title VII sex- and national-origin-discrimination case, that plaintiff failed
to show an actionable "ultimate employment decision").
132. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 321 F.3d 1203, 1204 (6"h Cir. 2003);
see generally Brief of Pl./Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 4 & Petition for Rehearing En Banc,
White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 321 F.3d 1203 (2003) (Nos. 00-6780 & 01-
5024), 2002 WL 32750745 (arguing, in addition to discussing the circuit split, in support of
petition for an en banc rehearing, stating that the panel decision was inconsistent with Sixth
Circuit precedent).
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Burlington's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 3 After stating the
facts of the case, the court began its discussion by assessing the evolution
of the relevant Sixth Circuit precedent. Indeed, the court identified Kocsis
v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., as "the seminal case for defining adverse
employment action." 134 Kocsis was a disability discrimination case
brought under the Americans With Disabilities Act. In that case, the court
required the plaintiff to show that she had suffered "'a materially adverse
change in the terms of her employment"' to support her discrimination
claim. 135 The court extended the Kocsis standard to the Title VII retaliation
context in Hollins v. Atlantic Co.'3 6 In that case, the court held that the
plaintiff's lower performance evaluation ratings failed to rise to the level of
a materially adverse employment action. 3 7 Adhering to these precedents,
the en banc court in White II rejected White's suggestion that it adopt the
EEOC's broad definition of adverse employment action as "'any adverse
treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to
deter a charging party or others from engaging in protected activity;"'
instead, the court reaffirmed the material-adverse-employment-action
standard. 3 ' The court reasoned that "[s]ince the adverse-employment
action element developed by this Circuit is an exception to a broad, strictly
literal reading of Title VII's anti-discrimination provisions, we will
continue to define the exception narrowly so as not to frustrate the purpose
of Title VII while deterring lawsuits over trivial matters.' ' 139 Moreover, the
court went on to disapprove of its own reference to the "ultimate-
employment-decision" standard that was articulated in Dobbs- Weinstein, 
4
0
questioning that panel's reliance on outdated Fourth Circuit case law and
ultimately joining "the majority of other circuits in rejecting the 'ultimate
employment decision' standard.'
41
Applying the material-adverse-action standard to the facts, the court
first concluded that White's suspension without pay was sufficiently
adverse to support her claim of retaliation. 14 In the court's view, the fact
that White challenged the suspension decision and that Burlington later
"corrected" its action by reinstating White with full back pay and benefits
133. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F,3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 2004)
("White I").
134. See id. at 795-800 (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885-87
(6th Cir. 1996)).
135. Id. at 797 (quoting Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., 97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1993)).
136. Id. (quoting Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999).
137. Id. at 798 n.3 (discussing Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662).
138. Id. at 799-800.
139. Id. at 800.
140. See Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1999).
141. White I, 364 F.3d at 801.
142. Id. at 802-03.
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was not sufficient to deprive White of her right to recover for unlawful
retaliation under Title VII. 43 "The alleged discriminatory decision ... was
the suspension without pay."' 44 According to the court, this decision was
sufficiently adverse to support White's retaliation claim.
45
The court similarly concluded that White's reassignment from forklift
operator duties to standard track laborer tasks constituted an actionable
adverse employment action. 46 Reasoning that her new position "was by all
accounts more arduous and 'dirtier,"' and that "the forklift operator
position was objectively considered a better job," the court held that
White's job transfer was sufficient to support her claim.'
47
The position taken by the majority of the en banc court in White II met
little disagreement, drawing only one additional opinion on the issue
relevant here, and that opinion concurred in the result. Judge Clay agreed
with the majority that White's reassignment and her temporary suspension
without pay rose to the level of actionable adverse employment actions,
and supported the majority's rejection of the "ultimate employment
decision" standard that was applied in Dobbs- Weinstein.48 Judge Clay
wrote separately, however, because he disagreed with the material-adverse-
employment-action standard that the majority adopted. 49  Instead, he
supported the standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit and the EEOC,
whereby a plaintiff could establish the adverse-action element of a prima
facie case of retaliation by showing that the employer's decision "would be
'reasonably likely to deter [employees] from engaging in protected
activity. '  Thus, he disagreed with the majority's interpretation that the
language of and policy behind the statute suggest application of the same
"materially adverse" standard under the anti-retaliation provision as is
articulated under the anti-discrimination provision. Instead, Judge Clay
believed that the anti-retaliation provision's standard should be broader,
promoting greater access to the statute's remedial scheme and,
concomitantly, requiring that employers treat employees who have engaged
in protected activity more carefully than those in other classes of
employees protected by Title VII.
Dissatisfied with the new result, Burlington first sought rehearing
from the en banc appellate court. When the court denied its request on
April 26, 2005, Burlington saw review by the United States Supreme Court
as its best and only option. Thus, on August 24, 2005, Burlington filed a
143. Id. at 803.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 803.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 808-09 (Clay, J., concurring).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 809.
560 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:3
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, requesting the Court grant review.
Whether an employer may be held liable for retaliatory
discrimination under Title VII for any "materially adverse
change in the terms of employment" (including temporary
suspension rescinded by the employer with full back pay or an
inconvenient reassignment, as the court below held); for any
adverse treatment that was "reasonably likely to deter" the
plaintiff from engaging in protected activity (as the Ninth Circuit
holds); or only for an "ultimate employment decision" (as two
other courts of appeals hold). 5 '
In support of its Petition, Burlington placed primary emphasis on the
confusion flowing from the circuit split with respect to the adverse-action
standard in a Title VII retaliation case. 52 In addition, Burlington urged the
Court to grant review because "the issue arises with great frequency," both
in the Title VII context and under other federal employment statutes, as
well; and because "the ruling below will jeopardize legitimate employer
practices by the imposition of unwarranted and unpredictable litigation
risk."
, I5 3
4. The Supreme Court's Grant of Certiorari and the Parties' Briefs
to the Court
The Supreme Court granted review on December 5, 2005.54 In its
Brief to the Court, Burlington argued that the same adverse-action
standard, defined by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth'55 as a "tangible employment action," applies under both the anti-
retaliation provision and the core substantive provision of Tile VII, and that
White could not satisfy that standard. 5 6 Burlington pointed to both the
language of the statute as well as its legislative purposes in support of its
position that the two parts of Title VII have the same meaning, and that the
Court's precedent in Ellerth should control.'57
151. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. White, 126
S. Ct. 797 (U.S. 2005) (No. 05-259), 2005 WL 2055901. Burlington also sought the court's
review with respect to the applicable burden of proof on a re-trial that was limited to a claim
for punitive damages. See id. The Court denied review on this second issue. Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. 797, 797-98 (U.S. 2005).
152. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-17, White, 126 S. Ct. 797 (No. 05-259), 2005 WL
2055901.
153. Id. at 18-21.
154. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 797, 797 (2005).
155. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
156. Brief of Petitioner at 11-42, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct.
2405 (No. 05-259), 2006 WL 704480.
157. Id. at 11-24.
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Burlington then turned to the facts of White's case and argued that her
reassignment from forklift duties to standard track laborer tasks, in addition
to her temporary suspension followed by reinstatement with full back pay,
failed to meet this "tangible employment action" standard. As to the
former, Burlington emphasized that White was in fact hired not as a forklift
operator per se, but as a track laborer more generally, with forklift
operation being one of the many duties that she might be assigned as a
track laborer.'58 She therefore could not prove any adverse change in her
compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her job, because
she remained at all times in the job for which she was hired. 5 9 Burlington
additionally argued that White's temporary suspension did not suffice
because, being only "temporary and tentative," it was "not the official act
of the enterprise," and therefore could not support employer liability.
1 60
Further, such an act should not be actionable as a matter of policy,
stipulated Burlington, because employers need the discretion to act
promptly upon alleged workplace rule violations, which further promotes
Title VII's preference for "conciliation" and "voluntary compliance" over
litigation.
1 6'
White's opposition brief answered Burlington's arguments in turn by
focusing similarly on the language of the statute and its underlying
policies. 62  White urged that the anti-retaliation provision should be
interpreted on its face, and that the provision does not include any
materiality requirement.1 63 Rather, White asserted, the statute requires only
that the alleged "discriminat[ion]" be "against" the employee."6 Although
White never clearly articulated the standard that she proposed, she
contended that Burlington's proposed interpretation found no support in the
language of the statute, its underlying policies, or in Supreme Court
precedents. White then focused the remainder of her brief on proving that
her temporary suspension was amply sufficient to support her retaliation
claim and the jury verdict in her favor. 65 Specifically, White contended
that an employer cannot cure an unlawful suspension simply by later
reinstating the employee with back pay; instead, the employer should
remain liable for its wrongful acts regardless of its subsequent conduct.
66
158. Id. at 25.
159. Id. at 27.
160. Id. at 34 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762).
161. Id. at 38-40 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764).
162. Brief of Respondent at 8-19, 22-27, 37-38, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry Co. v.
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (U.S. 2006) (No. 05-259), 2006 WL 622126.
163. Id. at 8-13.
164. Id. at 9-10.
165. Id. at 38-50. Notably, at no point did White ever address the change in her job
duties in any detail.
166. Id. at 40-44.
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As White argued, Burlington should not be relieved of liability for its
wrongful act just because Burlington later rescinded the initial decision of
its supervisory employee to suspend her.
167
White also filed a "Supplemental Brief' in response to the brief filed
by the United States as amicus curiae. 6 8 Notably, the amicus brief filed by
the government supported the judgment in White's favor. 169 White filed a
critical response, however, expressing disapproval of the material-adverse-
action standard the government supported, on grounds that it was
unworkable as a matter of statutory interpretation and of policy. 170
The briefing closed with a reply filed by Burlington. 7' The Supreme
Court heard oral argument on April 17, 2006. The case was then submitted
to the Court for decision.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT STEPS INTO THE FRAY: WHITE PREVAILS
UNDER A NEW FORMULATION OF THE "MATERIAL ADVERSITY"
STANDARD
The United States Supreme Court issued its decision two months later
on June 22, 2006.172 The Court's nine justices unanimously agreed that the
actions taken against White-a reassignment of job duties and a temporary
suspension followed by reinstatement with back pay-were sufficient to
support the jury's verdict in her favor. 17 Only eight of the nine justices,
however, joined the majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer.174 Justice
Alito wrote separately to express his disagreement with the majority's
interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, though he reached the same
conclusion via an alternative analysis.
75
A. The Majority Opinion: A New Standard, No Clarity
The Court's analysis began with the language of the statute. 76 The
Court identified the anti-retaliation provision's use of the term
167. Id.
168. Supplemental Brief for Respondent, White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (No. 05-259), 2006 WL
690256.
169. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, White, 126 S.
Ct. 2405 (No. 05-259), 2006 WL 622123.
170. Supplemental Brief for Respondent, White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (No. 05-259), 2006 WL
690256.
171. Reply Brief of Petitioner, White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (No. 05-259), 2006 WL 937535.
172. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405.
173. Id. at 2416, 2421.
174. Id. at 2408.
175. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 2410.
2007] ADDING SUBJECTIVE FUEL TO THE VAGUE-STANDARD FIRE 563
"discriminate against" as the focal point of the case, and stated that while
"[n]o one doubts that the term 'discriminate against' refers to distinctions
or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals," the Circuit
Courts of Appeals nevertheless disagree on the answers to two related
questions concerning this terminology: (1) whether the phrase
encompasses harms that occur outside the workplace or are not job-related;
and (2) what is the requisite level of harmfulness to which the retaliatory
discrimination must rise.177 According to the Court, then, resolving this
disagreement required it to answer both of those questions in this case.17
The Court addressed each in turn, and then discussed how the conclusions
it reached applied to the present facts. Thus, one can state the majority's
holding in three parts: (1) that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII is
broader than the statute's core substantive provision insofar as it
encompasses employer actions and harms that either occur outside the
workplace or are otherwise non-work-related; (2) that a plaintiff claiming
violation of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII must show that the
alleged employer action would have been materially adverse to a
reasonable employee in the plaintiff's position, meaning that it "might well
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination;" and (3) that White's reassignment and suspension satisfy
that standard.179
1. The Court Extends the Anti-Retaliation Provision's Reach to
Non-Workplace Harms
The Court's discussion of the first question-whether the anti-
retaliation provision reaches non-workplace harms-focused primarily on a
comparison of the anti-retaliation provision to the statute's core substantive
provision."8  Specifically, the Court placed great weight on Congress's
omission from the anti-retaliation section of language defining the types of
harms covered by the statute's core substantive provision as those actions
that affect the employee's "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment."18' The anti-retaliation provision, by contrast, refers only
to "discriminat[ion]," and contains no further description or limitation as to
177. Id. at 2410-11; see also supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text (discussing
circuit split).
178. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411 (2006).; see also
infra notes 188 and 247 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Court was wrong to
decide whether anti-retaliation provision encompasses non-work-related harms).
179. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2409, 2414-16.
180. Id. at 2411-12; see also supra Part II.A. (comparing and contrasting statutory
provisions).
181. Id. at 2411.
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the sort of harmful acts it prohibits." 2 These "linguistic differences" led
the Court to presume that Congress intended the provisions to cover
different acts, a presumption for which the Court found ample support in
the purposes of the provisions. 18 3  According to the Court, "the anti-
discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not
discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-
based status.' l 4 .On the other hand, the anti-retaliation provision "seeks to
secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering
(through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance
enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees."' 85 As such, the Court held that
the substantive provision seeks to accomplish its goals by simply
prohibiting employment-related discrimination: "The substantive
provision's basic objective of 'equality of employment opportunities' and
the elimination of practices that tend to bring about 'stratified job
environments,' . . . would be achieved were all employment-related
discrimination miraculously eliminated.' ' 8 6 While the Court could not say
the same about the anti-retaliation provision, the court found that "[a]n
employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions
not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the
workplace."' 87 As such, the Court concluded that the "purpose reinforces
what the language already indicates, namely, that the anti-retaliation
provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory
actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment."'
8
As a means of reinforcing its conclusion, the Court also discussed the
failure of either its own precedents or EEOC authorities to support
Burlington's proposed interpretation. First, the Court rejected Burlington's
suggestion that the Court's decision in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
182. Id. at 2411-12.
183. Id. at 2412.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18
(D.C. Cir. (2006)).
188. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2412-13. Notably, this entire section, except to the extent that it
supports the Court's formulation of the material adversity standard and its specific holdings
about the sufficiency under that standard of White's alleged adverse acts, is dicta. Both of
the alleged retaliatory acts-White's reassignment from forklift to track-laborer duties and
her temporary unpaid suspension--clearly related directly to White's employment. Thus,
contrary to the Court's assertion, it did not need to decide whether the anti-retaliation
provision encompasses non-workplace harms in order to decide this case. See id. at 2411
(discussing whether anti-retaliation provision encompasses non-workplace harm).
Nevertheless, the Court devoted substantial attention to this issue, and purported to reach a
holding directed to it. Id. at 2412-13. The impact of this pernicious dicta is discussed in
more detail infra, at Part V.A.
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supplies the appropriate standard under the anti-retaliation provision.'89 To
the contrary, the Court stated that "Ellerth did not mention Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision at all" and therefore has no bearing on this case.190
Instead, the Court limited Ellerth's holding to defining the term "tangible
employment action" only for the purpose of "'identify[ing] a class of
[hostile work environment] cases' in which an employer should be held
vicariously liable (without an affirmative defense) for the acts of
supervisors."'9' Ellerth did not, therefore, as Burlington suggested and as
many Circuit Courts had found, define the scope of actionable adverse
employment decisions under Title VII generally. Its holding, said the
Court, was far more limited.
The Court likewise found no support from the EEOC for Burlington's
position. The Court conceded that earlier versions of the EEOC's
Compliance Manuals limited the scope of the anti-retaliation provision to
"adverse employment-related action."' 92 However, the EEOC promoted a
broader interpretation not only elsewhere in those same manuals but also in
other Commission publications during that same time. 93 Moreover, and
more importantly, said the Court, the EEOC's latest version of the
Compliance Manual addressing the anti-retaliation provision is the only
direct statement on the scope of that provision and interprets it far more
broadly than Burlington proposed.
94
Finally, the Court rejected Burlington's suggestion that it would be
illogical to interpret the anti-retaliation provision as providing greater
protection to victims of retaliation than victims of discrimination. 95 Such
an interpretation best serves the differing purposes of the two provisions by
assuring that employers provide the "cooperation upon which
accomplishment of the Act's primary objective depends.' 96 Moreover, the
Court noted that Congress has similarly afforded broader protection to
victims of retaliation in other contexts, citing to the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). That is, the NLRA's substantive provision
prohibits "discrimination in regard to . . . any term or condition of
employment," while its anti-retaliation provision prohibits not only
"discharge" but also other forms of "discriminat[ion]."' 97 Thus, the Court
concluded, Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is broader than its core
189. Id. at 2413.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2413-14.
195. Id. at 2414.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), § 158(a)(4)).
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substantive provision, at least insofar as it "extends beyond workplace-
related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm."'98
2. The Court Adopts a Material Adversity Standard With
Alternative Objective and Subjective Components
Next, the Court turned to the second question raised by the circuit
split: the scope of retaliatory acts that the statute prohibits. Here, the Court
struck a middle ground between the standards proposed by the parties and
held that "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means
it well might have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination."" 99 Explaining its conclusion, the
Court reasoned that "material adversity" is required in order "to separate
significant from trivial harms" because Title VII "does not set forth 'a
general civility code for the American workplace."'200 Employer acts that
amount to nothing more than "petty slights" or "minor annoyances" fall
outside the scope of actionable material conduct, said the Court, because
such acts would not deter protected conduct-the problem against which
the anti-retaliation provision is intended to protect. 20 ' Thus, the Court
concluded that the materiality standard strikes the appropriate balance
because it "will screen out trivial conduct while effectively capturing those
acts that are likely to dissuade employees from complaining or assisting in
complaints about discrimination. 2 °2
The Court also instructed that while courts should apply its standard
objectively, "context matters., 203 Thus, the Court purported to ensure that
its standard was "judicially administrable" by focusing attention on the
"reactions of a reasonable employee". 204 Nevertheless, the Court indicated
that the specific circumstances surrounding each employee's situation must
be taken into account.205 The Court provided two examples:
A schedule change in an employee's work schedule may make
little difference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a
young mother with school age children. . . .A supervisor's
refusal to invite an employee to lunch is normally trivial, a
nonactionable petty slight. But to retaliate by excluding an
198. Id.
199. Id. at2415.
200. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2416.
203. Id. at 2415.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2415-16.
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employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes
significantly to the employee's professional advancement might
well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about
discrimination. Hence, a legal standard that speaks in general
terms rather than specific prohibited acts is preferable, for an "act
that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others."
206
Thus, the Court's standard requires that a plaintiffs alleged adverse action
be one that would deter a reasonable, objectively-viewed employee, but
one in the plaintiffs specific position, from complaining about
discrimination. These examples therefore inject substantial subjectivity
into the Court's nominally objective standard. The biggest problems with
White's holding originate here, as will be discussed in more detail below.2 °7
3. The Court Upholds White's Retaliation Claims Based on the
Reassignment of Her Job Duties and Her Temporary Unpaid
Suspension
The Court then applied its standard to the facts of White's case.
Turning first to White's reassignment from forklift duties to standard track-
laborer tasks, the Court recognized that changing an employee's job duties,
even within the employee's existing job description, might well amount to
retaliation, as by requiring an employee to perform "more arduous" tasks
rather than "those that are easier or more agreeable. 2 °8 Such an action
could deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination
or participating in the discrimination-investigation process. 0 9 The Court's
analysis went further, however, to take account of "the circumstances of
[White's] particular case., 210 Here, the Court noted that
the jury had before it considerable evidence that the track laborer
tasks were 'by all accounts more arduous and dirtier'; that the
'forklift operator position required more qualifications, which is
an indication of prestige'; and that 'the forklift operator position
was objectively considered a better job and the male employees
resented White for occupying it.'
21'
As such, the Court determined that the evidence supported the jury's
verdict in White's favor, as "the reassignment of responsibilities would
206. Id.
207. See infra Part V.
208. Id. at 2416.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2417.
211. Id.
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have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee. '1
The Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to White's thirty-
seven day unpaid suspension. Here, the Court again engaged a two-part
analysis, concluding first that "[m]any reasonable employees would find a
month without a paycheck to be a serious hardship" and, second, that
White in particular found the suspension difficult, in that she had no
income at Christmas, became very depressed, and ultimately obtained
medical treatment for her emotional distress.213 Thus, the Court concluded
that a thirty-seven day suspension "could well act as a deterrent" to
engaging in protected activity and therefore was sufficiently adverse to
support White's claim. 4  Moreover, the fact that Burlington later
rescinded its suspension decision and reinstated White with full back pay
was of no consequence. 215 The Court rejected Burlington's contention that
because Title VII, throughout much of its history, provided only for
equitable relief, it should not be interpreted to encompass this case simply
because Title VII was amended in 1991 to permit recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages.216 Indeed, such an amendment, said
the Court, provides further support for the conclusion that Congress
intended to afford a right of recovery to plaintiffs in White's position, as
Congress's expressed intention in affording such remedies was to "help
make victims whole. 21 7  Thus, the Court concluded that both of the
retaliatory acts alleged by White could support her claim, as both would
deter not only a reasonable person in general, but also one in plaintiffs
specific position, from engaging in the enforcement activities the anti-
retaliation provision encourages.
4. Without Complete Unanimity: Justice Alito's Concurring
Opinion
While he agreed with the Court's ultimate conclusion that the
employer decisions alleged by White were sufficient to support her
retaliation claim, Justice Alito wrote separately to express his disagreement
with the adverse-action standard announced by the Court. According to
Alito, the anti-retaliation provision suggests only two possible
interpretations."' The first-the one "staunchly defend[ed]" by White-
"makes [section] 703 narrower in scope than [section] 704 and thus implies
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 219 (1999) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-
40, pt. 1 at 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 602-03)).
218. Id. at 2418-19 (Alito, J., concurring).
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that the persons whom Title VII is principally designed to protect-victims
of discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion-
receive less protection than victims of retaliation. 2 19 It also "'makes a
federal case' out of any small difference in the way an employee who has
engaged in protected conduct is treated., 220 Alito expressed "doubt that
Congress meant to burden the federal courts with claims involving [such]
relatively trivial differences in treatment," and therefore found the second
possible interpretation-that adopted by the majority of the Circuit Courts
of Appeals-more plausible.2 2' Under this interpretation, the anti-
retaliation provision reaches the same discriminatory acts as the statute's
core substantive provision-i.e., only those that are "materially adverse" to
a reasonable person. Alito praised this standard both for its objectivity and
for its ability to "weed[] out" insignificant claims on summary judgment
motions, "while providing ample protection for employees who are subject
to real retaliation. 222  Moreover, contrary to the majority, Alito found
support for this interpretation in the Court's decision in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, as the Court there "'import[ed]' this test for use
in a different context-to define the term 'tangible employment action,' a
concept we used to limit an employer's liability for harassment carried out
by its supervisors. 22 3
Alito then proceeded to criticize the interpretation adopted by the
majority for lacking support in the language of the statute. First, Alito
denounced the Court's reliance on its view that the Act's "only purpose" is
prevention of employer decisions that might deter protected activity,
explaining that such a narrow view is inaccurate.224  This view is too
narrow, according to Alito, because it fails to account for other purposes
plausibly served by the Act, including the prevention of harm to
individuals, a purpose expressly recognized elsewhere in the majority
opinion.225
Second, Alito predicted that the majority's test "well might dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination"
and would "lead to perverse results. 226 Specifically, it would require a
court to take account of the nature and severity of the discrimination
claimed by the employee and would force them to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis of suffering alleged discrimination quietly versus risking
retaliation for complaining. Alito pointed out that the threat of retaliation is
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2419.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2420.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2421.
570 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:3
much less likely to deter the victim of the severest forms of discrimination
than the victim of less significant acts of discrimination. As such, the
majority's deterrence standard would function illogically to afford relief
from retaliation to fewer victims of severe discrimination, and more victims
of de minimis discrimination, who are more likely to be dissuaded from
engaging in protected activity. 227 Further, Alito attacked the majority's
standard as unclear, insofar as it purports to be objective but still requires a
court to take account of some unidentified set of individual characteristics
such as whether the employee has young children at home, and what the
employee's family financial situation might be.228
Finally, but without much explanation, Alito condemned the
majority's test as supplying a "loose and unfamiliar causation standard"-
one that he found unwelcome "in an area of the law in which standards of
causation are already complex., 2 9  Alito therefore disagreed with the
majority's formulation of the relevant adverse-action standard and
proposed instead that the anti-retaliation provision should reach the same
discriminatory acts covered by the statute's core substantive provision.23 °
While concededly not the most loyal to the plain language of the statute,
such an interpretation would, according to Alito, afford sufficient
protection to victims of "real" retaliation while providing an objective
standard that the judiciary could administer with substantial clarity. 3
Alito concluded by applying his material-adversity standard to the
facts of White's case, and reached the same conclusion as the majority.
That is, Burlington's decision to assign White to new duties that were
admittedly "more arduous" and "dirtier," as well as less prestigious, served
as almost a defacto demotion and was therefore amply sufficient to support
her claim.232 Alito likewise determined, though without explanation, that
White's 37-day unpaid suspension also satisfied his formulation of the
relevant standard. Thus, although their paths differed, Alito and the
majority eventually reached the same destination.
V. THE WAYWARD WAYS OF THE COURT: AN UNWORKABLY VAGUE
AND IMPRACTICAL STANDARD THAT FAILS TO MEET STATED OR
NECESSARY GOALS
The analytical approach taken in the majority and the concurring
opinion in White properly focuses on the language of the statute but does so
227. Id. at 2420-2 1.
228. Id. at 2421.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2421-22.
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from such a narrow vantage that the Court fails to take sufficient account of
other important statutory-interpretation criteria. The careful consideration
of these criteria ought to lead to a somewhat different result. As the Court
has repeatedly stated, the first step in the statutory-interpretation process is
to determine whether the language of the statute at issue is plain and
unambiguous.233 Where the language is plain and unambiguous, no
interpretation is necessary and the court must enforce the statute as
written.234 Ambiguity exists only when the statutory language, on its face
as well as in context, "is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more different senses.,, 235  Thus, if the court
finds that the language of the statute is ambiguous, then the court endeavors
to discern its meaning by reference to what its drafters intended.236 This
process should involve inquiry into three matters: (1) the language of the
statute in both the narrow context in which it appears and the broader
context of the statute as a whole; (2) the policy goals or purposes that the
statute serves, as reflected in its legislative history and/or elsewhere; and
(3) the reasonableness of the proposed interpretation in light of practical
considerations.237
233. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337, 340 (1997); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:02 at 6-1 l(West 6th ed. 2000) (collecting cases to support proposition
that "'[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of
interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no
discussion."').
234. Costa, 539 U.S. at 98; Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340; SINGER, supra note 233, § 45:02,
at 6-11.
235. SINGER, supra note 233, § 45:02, at 11-12. As renowned statutory-interpretation
scholar Professor Norman J. Singer points out, though, it can rarely be said that statutory
language is truly and wholly unambiguous on its face, as words only occasionally have
intrinsic meanings. Id. at 12-13. By way of example, Professor Singer posits that while the
term "automobile" "has fairly determinate content and is not likely to cause great difficulty
in interpretation, . . . the word 'bill' may refer to an evidence of indebtedness, to currency,
to a petition, to a person's name, to the anatomy of a bird, a portion of a cap and a host of
other objects, and may need 'interpretation' and 'construction."' Id. at 13. Thus, "[i]t is
only through custom, usage, and convention that language acquires established meanings,"
so a court's conclusion that statutory language is unambiguous often means simply that the
court has already construed the language of the statute and will apply the meaning assigned
in that process, or perhaps that the court is unwilling to consider the impact of extrinsic
evidence on the meaning of particular statutory language and so opts to declare its meaning
unequivocally instead. Id. at 13-14.
236. SINGER,supra note 233, § 45:05, at 25.
237. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (referencing
"text, structure, purpose and history of the ADEA" as interpretive resources supporting
conclusion that ADEA not intended to prohibit employer from favoring older workers over
younger ones); Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345 (turning to "broader context provided by other
sections of the statute" and statute's purposes in resolving ambiguity as to meaning of term
"employees" in anti-retaliation provision of Title VII); SINGER, supra note 233, § 45:13, at
107-08 (identifying as resources of interpretation statutory language and context, legislative
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While the Court in White gave some consideration to the language of
the anti-retaliation provision and its context, as well as at least one of its
purposes, the Court did not go far enough in its inquiries. As a result, the
Court's interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision is inconsistent with
the language of Title VII in its broader context, fails to fulfill the policy
goals of the statute as a whole, and implements an unworkably vague
standard that is wholly impractical in the real world.
In the remaining Parts V and VI of this Article, I will discuss each of
these problems with the White decision, and in turn offer a proposal to
remedy the situation. Thus, in subpart V.A. below, I will show how the
Court's narrow view of the anti-retaliation provision alone without
sufficient reference to the context in which it appears leads the Court to
interpret the statute more broadly than the statutory language and structure
warrant. In subpart V.B., I will turn to the Court's singular focus on
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms as the primary or only
goal of the anti-retaliation provision and demonstrate that it disregards and
even contravenes other equally important statutory purposes. In subpart
V.C., I will explain how the interpretation adopted by the Court
unjustifiably ties the hands of employers and implements a standard that
will lead to continued lack of clarity in the lower courts. Finally, in Part
VI, I will offer a solution to the problems that the Court's decision in White
creates and propose a revision to the statute's anti-retaliation provision that
will change the relevant standard to better fit the context of the statute as a
whole and better fulfill its broader policy goals. Because the effect of stare
decisis in a case like this is so strong, these problems cannot easily be
remedied by further Court action.1 8 Instead, Congress should intervene to
overrule legislatively the Court's decision in White and impose a clearer
anti-retaliation standard that is more loyal to the statute's language and
underlying purposes.
A. The Court Makes a Rocky Start: Neither the Statutory Language nor
Its Context Compels the Majority's Interpretation
The first problem with the Court's analysis is its narrow view of the
statutory language that fails to take sufficient account of the broader
context in which the anti-retaliation provision appears. This problem is not
apparent at first blush. Indeed, the Court began its analysis much as one
might expect, focusing on the statutory language and honing in on the term
history and underlying policy, and "concepts of reasonableness").
238. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 362-63 (2000) ("The policy of
stare decisis is at its most powerful in statutory interpretation, which Congress is always free
to supersede with new legislation.").
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"discriminate against" as critical. 39 Breezing past any inquiry into whether
the statute contains an ambiguity needing interpretation, the Court
summarily concluded that "[n]o one doubts that the term 'discriminate
against' refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure
protected individuals. ' 240  The Court proceeded to recognize that,
notwithstanding this declaredly universal truth, courts have disagreed as to
"whether the challenged action has to be employment or workplace related
and ... how harmful that action must be to constitute retaliation., 24' After
highlighting the circuit split on this issue, the Court acknowledged that
some courts read the language of these two similar, but not identical,
provisions in pari materia-the position advocated to the Court by
Burlington.242 Most such courts conclude, as urged by Burlington, that the
term "discriminate against" should be read to mean the same thing in both
provisions, so that both occurrences of the term encompass the same scope
of employer actions, not only as to employment-relatedness (i.e., workplace
harms only), but also as to severity.243
The Court rejected this position, though, and instead found that "[t]he
language of the substantive provision differs from that of the anti-
retaliation provision in important ways. 244  Specifically, the Court
accorded great weight to the substantive provision's use of the terms
"hire," "discharge," and "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment," which terms are conspicuously absent from the anti-
retaliation provision.245 The Court therefore "presume[d]" that "Congress
intended its different words to make a legal difference," and proceeded to
justify its conclusion in light of statutory purposes.246
While the Court's analysis took into account both the language of the
anti-retaliation provision and the statute's core substantive provision, the
range of analysis used still stopped short of what it should have been. The
Court's focus was too narrow, leaving its result flawed. A broader scope of
inquiry in at least two respects at this statutory-language-focused
interpretive phase would likely have left open the possibility of contrary
results, instead of leading the Court so quickly to "presume" that any
difference in language reflects intentionally different meaning.
First, and pertinent specifically to the Court's first holding that the
anti-retaliation provision encompasses non-workplace harms,247 the Court
239. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2006).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2410-11.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2411.
245. Id. at2411-12.
246. Id. at 2412.
247. This aspect of the Court's decision is dictum. See supra note 188. Nevertheless,
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never discussed the fact that both sections 703(a) and 704(a) define "an
unlawful employment practice. 248 That terminology appears prominently
at the beginning of not only the first subpart of the core substantive
provision, but also in nearly every other subpart thereafter, each of which
makes it "an unlawful employment practice" for the type of entity covered
by that subpart (e.g., an employment agency,24 9 a labor organization,25 ° or a
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship25 ) to
"discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 25 2 The anti-retaliation provision is
identical insofar as Congress therein made it "an unlawful employment
practice ... to discriminate against" those individuals who engage in
protected activity."'
Congress's repeated reference to "an unlawful employment practice,"
as opposed to, for example, "an unlawful practice" more generally, surely
is not unintentional. Such specific, prominent, and repeated reference to
employment practices warrants at least mention, if not more detailed
attention, in an analysis of whether the statute encompasses wrongs outside
of or that do not depend on an employment relationship. Indeed, to
disregard (or at least exclude discussion of) this statutory language, as the
Court did, is disloyal to the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, that
"effect [should be] given ... to every word, clause, and sentence of a
statute.,254 The Court's singular focus on Congress's omission from the
anti-retaliation provision of certain words describing the kind of
discrimination made actionable under the statute's core substantive
provision results in an overly narrow analysis that misses a key point.
While such distinctions should not be disregarded entirely, Congress's use
of the term "employment practice" in labeling the activities made unlawful
by the statute is more instructive on the question of whether the statute
encompasses non-workplace harms than is its extrapolation, or lack thereof,
on the basic term "discriminate against" in describing the prohibited acts
themselves. The statute prohibits "discriminat[ion]," but only activities
that constitute "employment practices" need to be considered in the first
place.
because the Court represents its determination of this issue as a "holding," this dictum is
likely to have substantial influence, if not be determinative, in subsequent lower court
decisions.
248. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), 2000e-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
249. Id. § 2000e-2(b).
250. Id. § 2000e-2(c).
251. Id. § 2000e-2(d).
252. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
253. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
254. SINGER, supra note 233, § 46:06, at 181 (emphasis added); see also United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
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Congress's use of the term "employment practices" is not alone
sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Act does not include non-
workplace harms. However, the Court's narrow focus on the term
"discriminate against" and its modifiers inappropriately disregards other
key language in the operative provisions of the statute. The result is that
the Court too quickly concludes (or "presume[s]," as the case may be) that
the core substantive provision and the anti-retaliation provision have
different meanings, while a closer look at the statutory language in context
would reveal striking and important similarities. Thus, consideration of
Congress's repeated reference to "employment practices" in defining the
conduct made unlawful by the statute does not necessarily compel a
different result than that reached by the Court on the facts of White, but it at
least leaves open the possibility that the anti-retaliation provision does not
encompass non-workplace harms.
This same error plagues the Court's second holding, in which the
Court states that the anti-retaliation provision prohibits any employer
conduct that is "materially adverse, which in this context means it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker [in the plaintiffs position] from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination. 2 5  Indeed, here, the
Court did not engage in a separate analysis of the statutory language or
context.256 Instead, the Court relied on its earlier conclusion that the two
provisions of the statute are different, and proceeded to justify its proposed
standard in light of statutory policy and its own precedents. 257  Had the
Court expanded the breadth of its inquiry into the statutory language and
context, its conclusion would not be justifiable because the statutory
language does not support the Court's test. As Justice Alito points out in
his concurring opinion, the anti-retaliation provision on its face simply
prohibits "discriminat[ion] against" employees who engage in protected
activity.258 The plainest meaning of this term would encompass any
difference in treatment that negatively impacts protected individuals.
Indeed, the majority's own definition of "discriminate against," which it
accepts without question, supports this interpretation.2 9 The Court did not,
however, adopt this "plain meaning" interpretation. Instead, the Court
implicitly, and I believe correctly, recognized that such a broad
255. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 483 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir.
2006)).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2415-16
258. Id. at2418.
259. Id. at 2410 ("No one doubts that the term 'discriminate against' refers to
distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals."); see also 110
CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) ("To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in
treatment or favor .... ).
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interpretation is inconsistent with the statute's underlying purposes. 26' As
such, the task before the Court turned to determining just what the scope of
that provision should be within the broad range of standards one might
propose. However, the Court did not turn to the language or context of the
statute for guidance, as the rules of statutory construction would first
advise. 26' Rather, the Court looked straight to its narrow perceptions of the
statute's purposes and concluded, without any further reference to the
language or context of the statute, that it prohibits "materially adverse"
employer actions that "well might have dissuaded" a reasonable worker in
the plaintiff s position from engaging in protected activity.262
Setting aside, for now, whether Title VII's purposes justify the
majority's position, 263 neither the statutory language nor its context
supports the Court's standard.264 Nothing about the statutory language or
its context suggests that Congress intended to prohibit employer actions
that might dissuade a reasonable worker in the plaintiffs position from
engaging in protected activity. Indeed, no part of the statute states, either
expressly or implicitly, that deterrence is a critical factor in the
actionability of a claim, or that it is even involved. Rather, the more logical
intrinsic interpretive aid in these circumstances is the very provision that
the Court casts aside-the other part of the statute that likewise makes
certain "employment practices" "unlawful," i.e., the core substantive
provision.
Justice Alito would have taken this approach. He agreed with the
majority (and with me) that the plainest interpretation, which is also the
broadest interpretation in this case, is not satisfactory.265 He suggested that
the only "other plausible interpretation . . . reads [sections] 703(a) and
704(a) together [so that] 'discriminat[ion]' under [section] 704(a) means
the discriminatory acts reached by 703(a)--chiefly, discrimination 'with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
260. See White, 126 S. Ct. at 2414 (beginning a discussion of a relevant adverse-action
standard with the premise that "[t]he anti-retaliation provision protects an individual not
from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm"); see also infra
Part V.B. (discussing the statute's purposes and their roles in statutory interpretation).
261. See SINGER, supra note 233, § 47:01 at 208 ("The starting point in statutory
construction is to read and examine the text of the act and draw inferences concerning the
meaning from its composition and structure." (footnote omitted)).
262. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2414-16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rochon v.
Gonzales, 483 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir.. 2006)).
263. See infra Part V.B (criticizing the Court's discussion of the statute's purposes as too
narrowly focused).
264. See White 126 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J., concurring) ("The majority's interpretation
has no basis in the statutory language and will, I fear, lead to practical problems.").
265. See supra notes 244-54 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacies of the
plainest interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision).
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employment.' 26 6 Alito then offered two sources of authority to support his
position: (1) lower court decisions applying a "materially adverse
employment action" standard under both provisions on this basis, and (2)
the Supreme Court's "import[ation]" of that same materially adverse
employment action standard to define "tangible employment action" in the
context of employer vicarious liability.267
Justice Alito's reasoning is not entirely clear and perhaps does not
even justify the result he reaches. First, the fact that numerous circuit
courts applied the same "materially adverse employment action" standard
under both the anti-retaliation provision and the core substantive provision
should not compel the Supreme Court to reach the same conclusion.
Second, as discussed above, the Supreme Court's "import[ation]" of the
materially adverse employment action standard to define "tangible
employment action" in Ellerth does not necessarily mean, or even suggest,
that the same standard applies here.26s The Ellerth holding pertained
specifically to principles of agency law, and the Court drew upon the lower
courts' adverse-action standard to mark the dividing line between those
supervisory acts for which the employer will be strictly liable and those for
which the employer may be liable only if negligent.269 Although Ellerth
certainly does not close the door to the application of that same materially
adverse employment action standard under the anti-retaliation provision, it
does not demand that result. At a minimum, some rationale to justify
applying Ellerth in this context is needed.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of Justice Alito's reasoning,
though, the premise from which he starts is sound. Where the language of
the statutory provision in question is ambiguous (here, the anti-retaliation
provision does not announce any particular adverse-action standard), the
first interpretive aid should be the language of other, closely-related
statutory provisions, so that the pertinent provision can be read in context.
In this case, the best and most obvious source in that regard is the core
substantive provision of Title VII, which, although not identical to the anti-
retaliation provision, bears a striking resemblance to it.270 Both provisions
266. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring).
267. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
268. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reliance upon
circuit court decisions to define "tangible employment action" in Ellerth and suggesting that
its significance for other contexts remained unknown thereafter).
269. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (setting the standard for an employer's vicarious liability
as partially determined by whether a supervisor's harassment culminated in a tangible
employment action or not).
270. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the differences and similarities between the anti-
retaliation provision and the core substantive provision).
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make it an "unlawful employment practice" for an employer to
"discriminate against" certain individuals.17' The main difference between
the two provisions is that the core substantive provision protects
individuals based on personal characteristics, while the anti-retaliation part
protects individuals based on their conduct.27 2  Aside from this obvious
distinction, the two provisions operate almost identically, except that the
core substantive provision offers more description as to the types of acts it
considers discriminatory. 273 This distinction was critical to the Court, and
led it to conclude that the scopes of the provisions are vastly different.
274
However, this conclusion is not compelled by the language of the statute,
read in context. Instead, it is equally plausible that Congress's omission
from the anti-retaliation provision of the additional descriptors it included
in its core substantive counterpart, while perhaps intentional, is not
reflective of such vast differences in intended meaning. Maybe Congress
used the terms "unlawful employment practice" and "discriminate against"
in both provisions to connote that the scope should indeed be the same, and
simply intended the abbreviated language in the anti-retaliation provision to
serve as shorthand for its earlier, more descriptive language.275 Although
such an interpretation is likewise not compelled by either the language of
the statute or its context alone, it is nevertheless plausible, and one that
should not be discarded without considering which interpretation best
comports with other intrinsic and extrinsic aids to interpretation, including
the statute's legislative history, policy, and purpose, as well as the
reasonableness of the proposed standard considering its practical
application. I therefore turn to those alternate sources now.
B. The Policy Arguments: The Court's Narrow View of the Statute's
Purposes Leads It Astray
The Court's limited construction of the statutory language and context
caused it to reach abrupt conclusions about the appropriate scope and
standard under the anti-retaliation provision, but it was the Court's
constrained view of the statute's purposes that ultimately led it astray.
After "presum[ing]" that Congress's use of additional modifiers with the
271. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), 2000e-3(a) (2006).
272. Id.; see also White, 126 S. Ct. at 2412 ("The substantive provision seeks to prevent
injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision
seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.").
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
274. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2414-16.
275. See Dep't of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994)
("[Ildentical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sorenson v. Sec'y
of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986))).
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term "discriminate against" in the core substantive provision signals an
intentional and stark difference in meaning between that provision and its
anti-retaliation counterpart, and in the absence of any legislative history
directly on point,276 the Court turned immediately to discussion of the
statute's purposes in an effort to justify its conclusions.277 Here, the Court
juxtaposed the purposes of the two provisions against one another,
recognizing the anti-discrimination provision's aim to prevent
discrimination against individuals in the workplace based on their race,
color, national origin, religion, or gender, and the anti-retaliation
provision's goal of "preventing an employer from interfering (through
retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of
the Act's basic guarantees. 278 The Court then concluded that, to secure the
substantive provision's goals, Congress only needed to prohibit
employment-related discrimination.279  However, securing the anti-
retaliation provision's goals, the Court continued, would require that
additional forms of discrimination be prohibited.28 0 The Court determined
that because "[a]n employer can effectively retaliate against an employee
by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by causing him
harm outside the workplace[, a] provision limited to employment-related
actions would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can
take. 281
The Court was not wrong to identify, and even emphasize, the
maintenance of "unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms" as an
important purpose served by the anti-retaliation provision. Indeed, that is
surely one of the most important goals of that part of Title VII. It is
undeniable that society cannot eradicate discrimination in the workplace-
and therefore meet the central goal of the statute as a whole-without
sufficient protection for employees who believe prohibited discrimination
is occurring.
The Court erred, however, in focusing so narrowly on what it
perceived as the only purpose of the anti-retaliation provision sufficiently
significant to warrant discussion. While no doubt important, such
"unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms" is surely not the only
purpose of that provision. Attention to the Court's source of authority for
that proposition verifies as much. In support of its assertion that unfettered
276. See Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230
(1st Cir. 1976) (noting that legislative history is silent as to the intended scope and meaning
of the anti-retaliation provision); Walterscheid, supra note 21, at 393 (noting the absence of
any legislative history directed to the meaning of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision).
277. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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access is the statute's primary purpose, the Court cited the only other
Supreme Court decision to identify specifically the policy behind Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision. In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Court
likewise relied exclusively on that same statutory purpose.8 2 There, the
Court held that the term "employees" in Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision includes not only current but also former employees.283 After
finding that term ambiguous on its face, the Court justified its conclusion
based on "[t]he broader context provided by other sections of the statute,"
wherein former employees may also make use of the statute's remedial
mechanisms, as well as what it perceived as "a primary purpose" served by
the statute: "Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms."284 Notably, however, the Robinson Court did not employ
restrictive language in its formulation of the statute's purpose. Instead, the
Court simply indicated that unfettered access to remedial mechanisms is "a
primary purpose of anti[-]retaliation provisions" generally, and cited to
cases decided under the National Labor Relations and Fair Labor Standards
Acts to support that position.2 5
Perhaps the Court's singular focus on maintenance of unfettered
access to the statute's remedies is justified in light of the dearth of pertinent
legislative history.28 6 Indeed, the legislative history offers very little in the
way of other potential purposes served by the anti-retaliation provision, and
the Supreme Court has never shed any further light on the subject. Even if
not explicitly stated in the legislative history or expressly adopted by the
Supreme Court, though, other plausible purposes likely exist. For instance,
one commentator has suggested that maintenance of the employer's
prerogative to manage the workplace as he or she sees fit, not maintenance
of access to the statute's remedies, is the only statutory purpose supported
by the anti-retaliation provision's history.28 7 Based on this view, the
employee protection afforded by the anti-retaliation provision must yield
to, or at least take into account, the employer's right to control his or her
282. 519 U.S. 337, 346 (relying upon "[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms" as "a primary purpose" underlying the anti-retaliation provision in
support of holding that term "employees" in that provision includes former employees).
283. Id., at 345-46.
284. Id.
285. Id., at 346 (emphasis added) (citing NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-22
(1972) and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292-293 (1960)).
286. See Walterscheid, supra note 21, at 393 (stating that legislative history of Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision is limited to committee reports that "simply repeat certain
language of Section 704(a) without any explanation of its meaning").
287. Id.
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business and its human resources.288 If the Court had considered this policy
rationale, its ultimate outcome would likely have been different.
Another plausible purpose served by the anti-retaliation provision is
its protection of the informal conciliation process. Title VII confers upon
the EEOC the power to investigate any charge of discrimination made
against an employer or other covered entity. 89 If, upon conducting such an
investigation, the EEOC determines "that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate
any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion. ' ' 9  This informal conciliation
process must take place before any formal litigation is filed.29' In order to
fulfill this duty, the EEOC must have access to all pertinent information,
including that obtainable from both the charging party and from other
employees. As such, another purpose underlying the anti-retaliation
provision might well be promoting the statute's conciliatory goals. This
process is heavily dependent upon the input of employees who in turn may
need the protection that this provision affords. Again, consideration of
such possible alternative statutory purposes might have at least influenced,
if not directly impacted, the Court's analysis.
The dearth of legislative history and of other worthy authorities
offering insight into the statute's purpose should not, however, narrow the
focus when interpreting the relevant provision, as it did in White. Instead,
the absence of clear indicators pertinent specifically to that provision
should cause the Court to cast its net more widely, with attention to the
purposes underlying the entire statute. Indeed, had the Court taken account
of other well-established goals served by Title VII, more generally-i.e.,
had the Court engaged a broader-scale inquiry of the statute's purposes-it
likely would have reached somewhat different conclusions.
At least three other policy goals that are served by Title VII deserved
attention here. First and foremost, Congress enacted Title VII to ensure
equality of employment opportunities among all individuals and to
eliminate those discriminatory practices that have disadvantaged people
with certain personal characteristics in the workplace.292 Although the
Court recognized this goal in its discussion of the core substantive
provision, it failed to give it sufficient attention. The Court discussed this
central goal of Title VII only insofar as to juxtapose it against the narrower
288. See infra notes 306-14 and accompanying text (discussing management prerogative
as statutory purpose relevant to interpretation of anti-retaliation provision).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
290. Id.
291. Id.; E.E.O.C. v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1101 (6th Cir. 1984).
292. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
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purposes served specifically by the anti-retaliation provision.293  These
differences in statutory purpose, said the Court, prove that the provisions
likewise differ in meaning--Congress intended one provision to eradicate
trait-based discrimination, while the other serves the wholly different goal
of "assur[ing] the cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act's
primary objective depends., 294 To treat these purposes as wholly separate,
however, is not consistent with construction of the statute as a whole.295
Rather, the two provisions of the statute must be read together to promote
not just the purposes served by each individual provision but also by the
entire statute.296 The Court concluded that since the two provisions serve
different purposes, they must have different meanings as well. This
position fails to take sufficient account of the primary goal of the statute as
a whole. Congress aimed, first and foremost, to eradicate discrimination on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, and gender when it enacted Title
VII. 297 The anti-retaliation provision, while also serving its own function,
should primarily promote this central goal. 298  The Court's holding in
White, however, accords broader scope and meaning to the anti-retaliation
provision than to the statute's core provision. 299 This, in turn, results in a
broader standard under the anti-retaliation provision that elevates the status
of individuals covered by it above those the statute aims first and foremost
to protect.
A simple hypothetical with two variations illustrates this principle.
Suppose an industrial company that assigns one employee to operate a
293. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412-14 (2006).
294. Id., at 2414.
295. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting that statutes
"should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions"); Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 233 (1993) ("Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can
a single provision of a statute.").
296. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948) ("[W]e must heed the equally
well-settled doctrine of this Court to read a statute, assuming that it is susceptible of either
of two opposed interpretations, in the manner which effectuates rather than frustrates the
major purpose of the legislative draftsmen."); SINGER, supra note 233, § 46:05, at 174-75
(referencing "cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall
control, and that all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest
object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and
the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction").
297. See Green, 411 U.S. at 800 ("The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of
Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.").
298. See id. at 799-800 (stating that anti-retaliation provision "relates solely to
discrimination against an applicant or employee on account of his participation in legitimate
civil rights activities or protests," while core substantive provision "deals with the broader
and centrally important question under the Act of whether for any reason, a racially
discriminatory employment decision has been made").
299. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006).
2007] ADDING SUBJECTIVE FUEL TO THE VAGUE-STANDARD FIRE 583
piece of heavy machinery (e.g., a bulldozer) as his or her primary duty.
Operating this bulldozer requires that he or she possess special skills.
Suppose further that, in response to complaints from other employees with
greater seniority who likewise possess the special skills required to operate
the bulldozer, the employer decides to re-assign the bulldozer operator to
perform other tasks so that the bulldozer-operation duties can be distributed
more broadly. The new duties assigned to the former bulldozer operator
fall within the broad parameters of the employee's basic job description.
Nevertheless, the employee is understandably disgruntled-he/she much
prefers the cleaner, and at least perceptibly more prestigious, bulldozer
operation duties. Now suppose further that in one scenario, this disgruntled
employee is an African-American female. In a variant on the same
hypothetical, the disgruntled employee is a white male who complained to
management just a few weeks earlier that female employees were harassing
him based on his sex. Under these circumstances, the African-American
female may be unable to make out a prima facie case of race or sex
discrimination because, perhaps among other things, the employer's act of
changing her duties within her pre-existing job description would likely not
be considered sufficiently adverse. 00 Such a change in duties within the
parameters of the employee's pre-existing job description simply does not
effect an "extreme . . . change in the terms and conditions of [her]
employment" as the Court requires.30 ' Thus, any claim she might bring is
subject to dismissal at summary judgment, if not before. By contrast,
however, the white male who recently complained of harassment is now far
more likely to survive past the summary judgment stage, and reach a jury
on his retaliation claim. The Court's holding in White provides direct
support for his claim.30 2 He is therefore much more likely to receive a
favorable settlement from the employer, even without having to expend the
time, energy and money required to pursue litigation. This hypothetical
may over-simplify the matter, but it nevertheless illustrates that the Court's
imposition of a broader adverse-action standard under the anti-retaliation
300. See, e.g., James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 2004)
("[A]bsent any decrease in compensation, job title, level of responsibility, or opportunity for
promotion, reassigmnent to a new position commensurate with one's salary level does not
constitute an adverse employment action even if the new job causes some modest stress not
present in the old position."); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(affirming summary judgment for the employer because the employee failed to show
sufficient adverse employment action to support a race discrimination claim based on job
transfer absent circumstances showing demotion or other "clear showing of adversity").
301. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) ("We have made it
clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of
employment....").
302. See White, 126 S. Ct. at 2417 (holding that reassignment to dirtier and more arduous
job duties from position of some prestige supports actionable retaliation).
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clause than under the core substantive provision elevates the status of those
who engage in protected activity above those the statute was originally
designed to protect.
Indeed, this hypothetical demonstrates that the Court's standard might
even lead to perverse results by creating an incentive for employees to
bring meritless claims in order to obtain protection from routine job
actions. For example, in a further variant on the hypothetical, if two
employees both apply for the open bulldozer-operator job, but one has
recently filed a complaint and therefore becomes protected under the anti-
retaliation provision, he is more likely to get that job, regardless of merit,
seniority, or any other more relevant factors. As such, the Court's standard
not only elevates the status of whistleblowers above the minorities whom
the statute was intended to protect, but it also creates classes among
employees, divided along lines of those who have engaged in protected
activity and those who have not, to the direct detriment of workplace
equity.
The Court addressed this concern only briefly, in response to similar
arguments offered by both Burlington and the United States government as
amicus curiae in their briefs to the Court.0 3  The Court's response,
however, is limited to the assertion that Congress likewise provided
protection from retaliation in other contexts "without any judicial
suggestion that those provisions are limited to the conduct prohibited by the
primary substantive provisions" of the respective statutes. 3°4 The Court
cited to the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), and cases decided
thereunder, as support, but its citations do not reflect any affirmative
determination that the NLRA's anti-retaliation provision is indeed broader
in scope than its substantive counterpart, or that such a conclusion is
required in any other context, under Title VII or otherwise. The Court's
citations indicate at most that the NLRA's anti-retaliation provision might
be broader in scope, not that in fact it is. 305 The Court therefore offered
essentially no substantive response to the well-founded argument that
applying a broader standard under the anti-retaliation provision needlessly
elevates the status of whistleblowers above historically mistreated and
down-trodden groups. As a result, the Court's analysis failed to take
sufficient account of the primary purpose underlying Title VII as a whole-
the eradication of workplace discrimination against minority individuals.
303. Id. at 2414.
304. Id.
305. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740 (1983) (discussing
breadth of anti-retaliation provisions of the NLRA but without reference or comparison to
Act's substantive provision); and NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1972)
(discussing purpose of the NLRA's anti-retaliation provision).
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The Court's standard also contravenes Title VII policy by
discouraging forethought by employers and interfering unnecessarily with
management prerogatives.3 °6  The Court has repeatedly touted the
importance of the latter of these policies, emphasizing that Title VII does
not require an employer to give preferential treatment to any of the
individuals it protects or to "restructure its employment practices to
maximize the number of [protected-class individuals] hired."3 °7 The former
of these policies is also important, and is most evident in cases like Ellerth,
where the Court held that an employer sued for sexual harassment by a
supervisor may mount an affirmative defense comprised of two parts: "(a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise."30 8 This decision provided a strong incentive for employers to
ensure that they had in place thorough and well-publicized policies
prohibiting any form of harassment in the workplace, to provide open lines
of communication between employees and management about alleged
harassment, to implement training programs at all employment levels, to
raise awareness of what constitutes harassment, and to impose stiff
penalties as evidence of the employer's unwillingness to tolerate it.
The Court's decision in White, however, does not promote any such
positive response because the standard it imposes is unworkably vague.
The Court describes its standard as an objective one. Indeed, the Court
devotes an entire paragraph to explaining the need for objectivity under
these circumstances:
We refer to reactions of a reasonable employee because we
believe that the provision's standard for judging harm must be
objective. An objective standard is judicially administrable. It
avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague
a judicial effort to determine a plaintiffs unusual subjective
feelings. We have emphasized the need for objective standards
306. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (referencing
encouragement of employer forethought as one of Title VII's "basic policies").
307. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981). See also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) ("The other important aspect of the
statute is its preservation of an employer's remaining freedom of choice .... The statute's
maintenance of employer prerogatives is evident from the statute itself and from its history,
both in Congress and in this Court."); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
206 (1979) (gleaning from legislative history of Title VII that Congress did not intend to
diminish traditional "management prerogatives").
308. 524 U.S. at 765.
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in other Title VII contexts, and those same concerns animate our
decision here.3°9
The very next paragraph, however, changes the landscape drastically,
injecting substantial subjectivity into the inquiry that the Court works so
hard to tout as wholly objective.31° Specifically, the Court qualifies the
"objective" adverse-action standard by requiring that courts take account of
the plaintiffs unique circumstances. The Court explained:
We phrase the standard in general terms because the significance
of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the
particular circumstances. Context matters. 'The real social
impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which
are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or
the physical acts performed.
31 '
The first of the two examples the Court then offers makes abundantly clear
the subjective nature of its test: "A schedule change in an employee's work
schedule may make little difference to many workers, but may matter
enormously to a young mother with school age children."'31 2 Thus, a
schedule change that might not "dissuade a reasonable worker from making
or supporting a charge of discrimination" and therefore is not "materially
adverse" under the objective side of the Court's standard, still might
nevertheless be actionable if the affected employee happens to have young
children at home." 3 But how is an employer contemplating such a
schedule change to know whether the affected employee has young
children at home needing attention at night?
The subjective side of the Court's standard therefore leaves an
employer considering any change that might affect an employee who has
recently engaged in protected activity with two choices: it can interview
the employee extensively in an attempt to ascertain whether the
contemplated change might somehow affect her more substantially than an
otherwise "reasonable worker" (the riskier approach), or it can refrain from
taking any action affecting her at all, regardless of its needs (the safer but
otherwise less desirable approach). The first option may encourage
forethought by employers-indeed, it does so to an extreme-but only to
the detriment of traditional management prerogatives, as employers will be
309. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006)
(emphasis in original) (citing Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004)
(constructive discharge doctrine)); see also, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993) (defining the hostile work environment doctrine)).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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forced to treat employees protected under the anti-retaliation provision with
kid gloves and thereby lose the ability to make and implement decisions
affecting such employees without exposure to substantial Title VII liability.
The second option, however, is in many respects worse, as it deprives the
employer entirely of the ability to manage its human resources in the way it
deems most effective. Moreover, the subjectivity of the standard casts such
ambiguity on whether a given employer action will support a retaliation
claim that an employer has almost no incentive to devote substantial
forethought to its course of action because it is almost impossible to predict
accurately how an employee's unique circumstances will bear upon any
change he might face. The educated employer will know that the best way
to avoid risk is to do nothing at all, rather than to undertake a more
extensive and thoughtful review of the situation.
Consider, for example, a relatively typical scenario in which this
concern might arise. Suppose that Employee A, a female, has complained
of sexual harassment by Employee B, her male supervisor. Cognizant of
its duties under Ellerth, the employer responded quickly to Employee A's
complaints and conducted a thorough investigation of her allegations,
which led the employer to conclude that some unlawful harassment had
indeed taken place. Thus, the employer determined that not only should
Employee B suffer an unpaid suspension, but also Employee A should no
longer have to report to or work with Employee B after he returns
(presuming the offense was not so grave as to warrant immediate
discharge). The organizational structure of the company, however, is such
that it could easily transfer Employee A to a different, comparable position
with the same pay and benefits, but would encounter substantial
organizational difficulty (and thus expense) not only finding an alternative
position for Employee B but also replacing him as a supervisor in
Employee A's department. After White, an employer is well advised to
transfer Employee B notwithstanding the extraordinary difficulties it may
then encounter, rather than Employee A, because it will incur a substantial
risk of Title VII liability by taking any action affecting Employee A,
especially without detailed knowledge of any unique circumstances that
might make her more susceptible to negative impact. While it is true that
Employee A should not be made to suffer any negative consequences from
these circumstances, of which she was victim and not perpetrator, Title VII
was not intended to require employers to treat the individuals protected by
it more favorably than others.?14 But the risk-averse employer faced with
this conundrum will likely do just that, and will accord special treatment to
314. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973) (noting that
purpose of Title VII is "to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate...
discriminatory practices" and not "to guarantee a job to every person regardless of
qualifications" or to afford preferential treatment to members of protected classes).
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Employee A in order to reduce the prospect of costly and time-consuming
litigation. Indeed, the risk-averse employer will likely not only do what it
takes to remove Employee B from Employee A's work environment, rather
than the converse, but will likely choose not to take any action that might
affect Employee A in any respect for at least several months and maybe
more, until the time period of presumptive causation has passed.
The approach adopted by the Court in White takes adequate account of
one of the central purposes of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision but fails
to accord sufficient consideration to other, equally important policies
underlying the statute as a whole. While prohibiting employer conduct
aimed at stifling employee participation in the enforcement process is
critical, it is improper to do so to such an extent that hampers other
statutory goals. Title VII aims chiefly to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace, and any interpretation of it should bear that goal in mind first
and foremost. The standard adopted by the Court in White not only
detracts from this worthy goal by elevating the status of whistleblowers
above those the statute was originally enacted to protect, but also interferes
substantially and unnecessarily with management prerogatives and even
discourages the employer forethought that the statute seeks to promote.
For these reasons and in light of other practical considerations discussed
below, the Court's interpretation simply does not work.
C. An Unworkable Standard in the Real World: The Impracticalities of
the Court's Approach.
Not only does the Court's decision in White fail to take adequate
account of relevant policy considerations, but it also implements a standard
that is unworkably vague in at least three respects. The first is readily
apparent on review of the Court's own illustration of its standard. As
discussed above,31 5 the Court's standard, although initially touted as
objective, includes highly subjective components. 3 6 The Court explained
that "any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular
circumstances," and offered as an example the single mother with young
children who suffers a far greater burden by a schedule change to the night
shift than many other workers without childcare needs would experience.
17
No doubt this is true. But by offering this example, the Court suggests that
an employer must ascertain substantial personal information about an
employee who has engaged in protected activity before making any
315. See supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text (discussing subjective side of
Court's standard).
316. See White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415-16 (qualifying objective standard on grounds that
"[c]ontext matters").
317. Id.
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changes that affect her job, as the alternative is having to defend any
subsequent lawsuit solely on the grounds that the decision was made for a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, and severely limiting its
opportunities to defend successfully a non-retaliatory decision at or prior to
the summary judgment stage. As such, the Court opens wide a large can of
worms. How extensively must the employer search to determine how a
proposed decision might affect a protected worker? What characteristics
should count? The standard is nominally objective-whether a reasonable
employee in the plaintiffs position would find the employer's action
materially adverse-but apparently requires an employer to engage in a
fact-finding mission of some unspecified scope. Moreover, because the
inquiry advised by the Court is so fact-specific, an employer striving to "do
the right thing" may be thwarted from doing so simply for lack of guidance
as to what questions it should ask, and which of the employee's myriad
unique circumstances it should take into account. The Court's subjective
standard also implicates concerns about employee privacy. If an employer
is required to dig deeply into an employee's personal life in order to
ascertain how a proposed employment action might affect him, his personal
life becomes the employer's business, and he might resist the process. In
any event, he must choose between disclosing the requested information or
possibly suffering what he perceives to be an adverse job action. Most
employers attempting to avoid liability will surely find this process
extremely unwieldy, if not impossible. As such, the subjectivity of the
Court's standard makes its implementation almost wholly unworkable in
the real world.
The Court's standard also suffers from ambiguity in the form of what
Justice Alito refers to as "a loose and unfamiliar causation standard." '318
This ambiguity arises from the Court's explanation of the "material
adversity" standard it imposes: "[A] plaintiff must show that a reasonable
employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,
'which in this context means it well might have "dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."' '3 19 As
with the Court's working-mother example, discussed above, this assertion
raises a multitude of questions. How does one (i.e., an employer
attempting compliance or a court adjudicating a claim) assess whether an
action "well might have dissuaded" protected activity? Is this somehow
different from an action that, for example, "would have dissuaded" that
same reasonable worker from lodging a complaint? What purpose does the
modifier term "well' serve? In other words, does the standard "well might
318. Id. at 2421.
319. Id. at 2415 (emphasis removed) (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Washington v. I11. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.
2005)).
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have dissuaded" protected activity differ from a standard that only
encompasses actions that simply "might have dissuaded" protected
activity? If so, how? The Court does not answer any of these questions,
nor does the Court provide any indication as to how an employer
attempting compliance, an aggrieved employee contemplating legal action,
or a court adjudicating a claim should answer them. Instead, the Court
leaves these questions open, to be decided by the lower courts, beginning
the process once again of defining the adverse-action standard under the
anti-retaliation provision.
Third, the deterrence-based aspects of the standard make it both
unworkably vague and detrimentally subjective in that it may require courts
and/or juries to assess the alleged adverse act relative to the severity of the
discrimination alleged in each case. Justice Alito raised this point in his
concurring opinion:
[T]he majority's interpretation logically implies that the degree
of protection afforded to a victim of retaliation is inversely
proportional to the severity of the original act of discrimination
that prompted the retaliation. A reasonable employee who is
subjected to the most severe discrimination will not easily be
dissuaded from filing a charge by the threat of retaliation; the
costs of filing the charge, including possible retaliation, will have
to be great to outweigh the benefits, such as preventing the
continuation of the discrimination in the future and obtaining
damages and other relief for past discrimination. Because the
possibility of relatively severe retaliation will not easily dissuade
this employee, the employer will be able to engage in relatively
severe retaliation without incurring liability under § 704(a). On
the other hand, an employee who is subjected to a much milder
form of discrimination will be much more easily dissuaded. For
this employee, the costs of complaining, including possible
retaliation, will not have to be great to outweigh the lesser
benefits that might be obtained by filing a charge.320
The majority responded directly to this criticism, stating simply that
"contrary to the claim of the concurrence, this standard does not require a
reviewing court or jury to consider 'the nature of the discrimination that led
to the filing of the charge.' . . . Rather, the standard is tied to the challenged
retaliatory act, not the underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title
VII complaint., 321 However, the majority's response does not answer the
problem. A hypothetical may aid illustration. Suppose that Employee A,
an African-American female, suffers a series of adverse employment acts,
including a 50% pay decrease along with a demotion from a high-level
320. Id. at 2420-21 (Alito, J., concurring).
32 1. Id. at 2416 (citation omitted).
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management position to a non-supervisory laborer position. Employee B, a
Muslim, is denied the reasonable accommodation of an hour off work at
noontime on two or three separate Fridays so that he may attend religious
ceremonies. 2 Suppose further that if either employee complains about the
discrimination suffered, the employer will deprive him or her of two days
of paid vacation time to which he or she is otherwise entitled. A reasonable
employee in B's position might be dissuaded from complaining about the
alleged discrimination for fear of losing two full days' worth of paid
vacation, thus making the employer's deprivation of a paid-vacation benefit
"material" under the majority's standard in that case. A reasonable
employee in A's position, however, would not be deterred from
complaining about the severe discrimination she has suffered, even if she
might also lose two days of paid vacation. This cost is not so high as to
deter her from complaining about the substantial losses she has already
sustained and from seeking relief. As such, the employer's act of denying
paid vacation might well be unlawful, actionable retaliation in B's case, but
at the same time fail to support a retaliation claim at all in A's. The Court's
reliance upon deterrence in defining what actions are sufficiently
"material" to support a retaliation claim therefore requires the court and/or
the jury in some, if not all cases, to assess the underlying discriminatory act
relative to the alleged retaliation, thereby injecting substantial vagaries and
greater unpredictability into the inquiry.
These considerations of reasonableness and practicality should
probably take a back seat to the other statutory interpretation tools
discussed above-the language of the statute itself,323 and the policies and
purposes behind it.3 24 Nevertheless, "[i]t is a 'well established principle of
statutory interpretation that the law favors rational and sensible
construction.' 3 25  The interpretation offered by the Court, while not
entirely irrational on its face, leads to impractical and irrational results. It
ties the hands of employers unnecessarily tight, and imposes a vague and
subjective standard that will leave employers, employees, and courts alike
guessing as to which employer actions are sufficiently adverse to be
actionable. The interpretation adopted by the Court in White is not
compelled by the statutory language and context, is inconsistent with the
322. Assume for purposes of this illustrative hypothetical scenario that the adverse acts
suffered by both employees otherwise constitute actionable discrimination under Title VII.
323. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of the
language of Title VII).
324. See supra Part V.B. (discussing the purposes and policies behind Title VII, as they
bear on its interpretation).
325. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:12, at 82-
83, 85 (West 6th ed. 2000); see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982)
("Statutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results
whenever possible.").
592 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:3
statute's broader policies and purposes, and is unworkably vague and
impractical in the real world.
VI. IN SEARCH OF A CuRE: A PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL
INTERVENTION TO FIX THE PROBLEMS WHITE CREATES
While the Court could feasibly fix the over-breadth, vagueness and
impracticality problems created by its decision in White, it is not likely to
do so. First, eight of the Court's nine justices joined in the majority
opinion, making that sort of sea change in the Court's direction unlikely to
occur any time in the near future. Second, the stare decisis effect of a
decision interpreting a statute is especially strong, making a contrary
decision all the more improbable.3 26 Thus, the most plausible fix to the
problems White creates requires Congress to step in. With just a few minor
revisions to the statute, Congress could easily implement a clearer, more
workable standard that better comports with the purposes and policies
supporting Title VII as a whole.
A. A Proposal for Congressional Action: Minor Revisions to Bring
About Greater Clarity
Congress should revise the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII to
make clear that its scope is identical to that of the statute's core substantive
provision and that the relevant adverse-action standard under both
provisions is therefore the same. To effect such a change would not require
substantial rewriting. Congress need only add a few key words to the anti-
retaliation provision to make clear that its scope is intended to mirror that
of its core substantive counterpart. I propose that Congress revise section
704 of Title VII by adding the underlined language as follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment with
respect to any such individual's compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, for an employment agency, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to
so discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization
to so discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for
326. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 362-63 (2000) ("The policy of
stare decisis is at its most powerful in statutory interpretation (which Congress is always
free to supersede with new legislation)." (citation omitted)); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (discussing the binding effect of prior Supreme Court
precedents interpreting Title VII, especially in light of fact that Congress has amended Title
VII substantially in the meantime without affecting the rule of such precedents).
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membership, because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.
The insertion of these few additional terms should reverse the Court's
decision in White in two important ways: (1) by making clear that the
scope of the anti-retaliation provision is identical to the scope of the core
substantive provision so that both sections apply only to those employer
actions that impact the terms, conditions, or privileges of the employee's
employment; and (2) by indicating that, because the provisions employ the
same language, the Court's interpretations of the core substantive provision
should inform interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, and vice
versa. Revision of the anti-retaliation provision in this manner, especially
if accomplished soon, would not cause any drastic change in the law, as it
would bring the scope and standard under the anti-retaliation provision in
line with that in place in the majority of jurisdictions before the Court
decided White.3 27 Moreover, such a revision would come closer to the
clarity needed in an otherwise vague area of the law, would promote
achievement of the statute's primary goals, and would comport with
standards of reasonableness that the practicalities of the real world demand.
B. Why Bigger Is Not Always Better: An Explanation of the Proposed
Statutory Revision
The revision I propose narrows the scope of the anti-retaliation
provision but improves its enforceability and effectiveness in the process,
thereby demonstrating that a bigger or broader, as the case may be, scope
or standard is not always better. Indeed, the revised standard departs little
from the approach followed in most jurisdictions before White, and changes
the outcome under White as to only a small subset of adverse actions that
an employer might take. Envisioning the range of actions an employer
might take against an employee along a spectrum from what the Court
might term "petty slights" or "minor annoyances 3 28 on one end, to
"ultimate employment decisions"3 29 like failure to hire and discharge on the
327. See supra Part III. (discussing the circuit split that preceded the Supreme Court's
decision in White and showing that the majority approach called for the interpretation of the
anti-retaliation provision consistent with the interpretation of the core substantive
provision).
328. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006)
(indicating that Title VII does not protect employees "from those petty slights or minor
annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience" (citation
omitted)); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (emphasizing
that Title VII is not "a general civility code").
329. See White, 126 S. Ct. at 2414 (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting the
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other end, facilitates explanation of this concept. Employer decisions that
lie at either end of this spectrum receive the same treatment under the
Court's standard in White and under the revised standard I propose, so that
my revision has no effect on decisions of either sort. "Petty slights" and
"minor annoyances" are too insignificant to warrant statutory remedy or
judicial involvement and therefore fall outside the scope of actionable
conduct under either standard, while "ultimate employment decisions" have
such a profound effect on employment that both formulations readily
encompass them. It is the vast grey area in between these two poles that
needs definition, and the standard I propose better provides that definition
than the highly subjective approach approved by the Court in White.
Job transfers, duty reassignments, negative performance evaluations,
and poor treatment by co-workers or supervisors occupy much of this
expanse between the poles anchored by "petty slights" and "ultimate
employment decisions." It is employment actions that have some impact
on an employee's job but are not so clearly either minor or substantial
enough that their actionability is beyond doubt, that cause the most
uncertainty, both for well-meaning employers attempting to manage the
workplace and for courts adjudicating claims. Thus, it is within this grey
area that definition is most needed. The standard offered by the Court in
White, however, fails to provide the necessary level of clarity. As
discussed above, the Court implements a standard that purports to be
objective but also injects substantial subjectivity into the adversity
inquiry.33 ° In this standard, the Court states that "a plaintiff must show that
a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse, 'which in this context means it well might have "dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination."""'33  This standard, as discussed above, is facially unclear
insofar as the Court provides no indication what its "well might dissuade"
standard means.332 The lack of clarity is magnified, however, when the
Court goes on to instruct that a court should not only ensure that the
conduct complained of would be "materially adverse" to a reasonable
employee, but that it would be so to one in the plaintiffs specific
adverse-action standard limited to "so-called 'ultimate employment decisions' (citing Id. at
2410)).
330. See supra notes 203-07 and 309-17 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court's
standard in White for its heavy reliance on the subjective state of plaintiffs mind and
plaintiff s own unique circumstances).
331. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (emphasis removed) (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d
1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006 )(quoting Washington v. I11. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658,
662 (7th Cir. 2005)).
332. Id. at 2421; see supra notes 318-320 and accompanying text (discussing the vague
nature of the Court's "well might dissuade a reasonable worker" standard (quoting id. at
2421)).
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position.333 The Court's first example here makes evident that this
subjective inquiry is wholly dependent of the objective one, as the Court
suggests that a schedule change that would make "little difference to many
workers," i.e., would not be materially adverse to a reasonable worker,
"may matter enormously to a young mother with school age children. 334
The revised standard I propose offers greater clarity than the Court's
vague "well might dissuade" formulation with a highly subjective
component, in that it limits actionable conduct to that which affects the
terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiffs employment and thereby
mirrors the statute's core substantive provision. As such, the same adverse-
action standard would apply under the revised anti-retaliation provision as
currently applies under the core substantive provision, so that only those
employer actions that rise to a threshold level of materiality could support a
claim.
The Supreme Court has not clearly defined the adverse-action element
of a Title VII claim but has instructed as to its scope on numerous
occasions. As discussed in more detail above,335 the Court has repeatedly
held that the core substantive provision's reference to the "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" does not limit actionable
conduct to that which affects the employee's "'terms' and 'conditions' in
the narrow contractual sense" but rather is much broader, encompassing
even some harms without any tangible or economic consequence.336 The
Court has made clear, though, that there are limits to this expansive
approach, that is, not every intangible and non-economic harm is
actionable. Instead, for an intangible or non-economic harm to support a
claim, it must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment.' ' 337  Thus, under the revised anti-retaliation
provision I propose, those employer actions that directly impact an
employee's compensation, or the terms, conditions, or privileges of his
employment, i.e., those that result in tangible or economic harms, will
support a claim. Also actionable are those employer decisions resulting in
333. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415-16 (providing examples that require the court to take
account of plaintiff's unique circumstances and indicating that the court should assess
materiality of the alleged adverse action from "the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff s position").
334. Id. at 2415.
335. See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text (highlighting Supreme Court cases
interpreting certain parts of Title VII).
336. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 77, 78 (1998) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 64 (1986); see also supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court cases defining adverse action under Title VII's anti-discrimination clause).
337. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (alteration in
original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
596 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:3
intangible or non-economic harms, so long as they are sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment.
Admittedly, this is still not a black and white test. Key terms like
"tangible," "severe," and "pervasive" remain relatively undefined and
provide room for disagreement and debate. Even the somewhat clearer
term "economic" leaves some room for doubt as to whether, for example,
the economic effect must be direct or immediate. Indeed, the Court is
correct that "'[t]he real social impact of workplace behavior often depends
on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships which are not fully captured by a single recitation of the
words used or the physical acts performed.' 33 8 As such, it would be
impossible to formulate a standard that provides a clear answer in every
case. The revised standard, though, would allow both courts and
compliance-ready employers to draw upon the developing body of case law
interpreting Title VII's core substantive provision to assist in answering
questions about the scope of actionable retaliation. Meritor Savings Bank
and its progeny begin to lay this framework. Ellerth could help here too, as
the Court might become more comfortable importing its definition of
"tangible employment action" so that the same definition applies in this
context as well.
3 39
Moreover, other cases further define the parameters. For instance, the
Court made clear in Oncale that Title VII does not set forth "a general
civility code" and "does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the
ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and
of the opposite sex.,"34  The Harris Court likewise emphasized that Title
VII has strict outer limits: "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough
to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is
beyond Title VII's purview., 34' The Court further elaborated in Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton that "simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the terms and conditions of employment.
3 42
The Court's decision in White is not entirely inconsistent with these
precedents. Indeed, in support of its "material adversity" standard, the
White Court cited both Oncale and Faragher for the proposition that Title
VII does not afford a remedy for "trivial harms" and explained that "petty
slights" and "annoyances" are not encompassed by Title VII's core
338. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82).
339. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998).
340. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
341. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
342. 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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substantive provision.343 In this respect, the revised standard I propose
would not depart substantially from the standard announced by the Court in
White. Instead, just as suggested by the Court, the revised provision would
incorporate these same limitations into the anti-retaliation provision that
have developed under the statute's core substantive provision, so that the
standards would be the same. Both would require what the Court terms
"material adversity. ' '344
My proposed revision would, however, improve upon the Court's
standard in that it would clear up the most substantial source of confusion
in White: its imposition of a subjective component that operates as an
alternative, not just a supplement, to the objective one. As discussed
above, the Court announces a nominally objective standard, but
substantially clouds the picture by offering an example that requires a
wholly subjective inquiry.3 45 The revised provision would fix this problem
by incorporating Harris' more workable objective-plus-subjective test
without sacrificing either component. In Harris, the Court held that a Title
VII plaintiff could prevail only upon showing not only that her work
environment is objectively hostile or abusive but also that it is subjectively
perceived by her as such.346  This hybrid approach offers substantially
greater clarity than the objective-or-subjective alternative approach at least
implicitly endorsed by the Court in White. Where the statute prohibits only
those employer decisions that meet a threshold level of objectively-viewed
materiality, a well-intentioned employer can more readily assess whether a
proposed course of action will run afoul of statutory requirements.
Likewise, such a standard better meets the White Court's stated goal of
being "judicially administrable" in that it "avoids the uncertainties and
unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a
plaintiffs unusual subjective feelings. 347
My proposed revision would not only clear up the confusion created
by the Court's subjective adverse-action standard but would also reverse
the Court's overly-expansive reading of the statutory language to
encompass non-workplace harms. The Court's holding on this point in
effect converts Title VII into a catchall tort statute, protecting an employee
who has engaged in protected activity from any adverse treatment
whatsoever, whether employment-related or not. For example, the Court's
343. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 ("So, in Harris, we
explained that in order to be actionable under the statute, a sexually objectionable
environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so."
(citation omitted)).
347. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
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decision could afford a Title VII claim to a restaurant employee who has
engaged in protected activity and is subsequently served rotten food while
dining there during non-working hours. Title VII is an employment statute
and should not reach so far. To do so will only dilute its effectiveness in its
intended sphere.
Moreover, the revised anti-retaliation provision would accomplish
much of what the Court apparently intended. The Court cited two cases in
support of its conclusion that because "[a]n employer can effectively
retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his
employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace," the anti-
retaliation provision should encompass non-workplace harms.348 In one of
those cases, the D.C. Circuit upheld a Title VII retaliation claim by an FBI
agent who alleged that his employer failed to provide off-duty security in
the face of death threats.349 In the other, the Tenth Circuit permitted
recovery against a car dealership that filed false criminal charges against a
former employee who had complained of discrimination. 30 The former of
these cases readily illustrates that it was not necessary for the Court to
expand the reach of the statute so far in order to satisfy its concerns, as off-
duty security is surely at least a "privilege," if not a "condition," of an FBI
agent's employment.3 1' The same could be said of the Tenth Circuit case
as well, where the charges filed against the former employee alleged that he
had stolen from the employer during his employment, thus connecting his
claim directly to his employment and obviating the need for a more
expansive remedy. Therefore, adding to the anti-retaliation provision the
qualifying language that appears in the core counterpart would accomplish
much the same result as desired by the Court, but without expanding the
statute's reach too far.
C. Maintaining Access While Equalizing Treatment: Policy
Justifications for the Proposed Statutory Revision
The statutory revision I propose would not only make the anti-
retaliation provision more readily enforceable, and therefore more
effective, but it would also better comport with Title VII's policies and
purposes. First, the revision would not detract from the statutory purpose
the White Court relied upon as primary: the maintenance of unfettered
348. Id. at 2412 (citations omitted).
349. Id. (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also
supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing Rochon).
350. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2412 (citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984,
986 (10th Cir. 1996)).
351. See id. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[Flor an FBI agent whose life may be
threatened during off-duty hours, providing security easily qualifies as a term, condition, or
privilege of employment.").
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access to the statute's remedial mechanisms. The Court accords
sufficiently broad protection under the statute's core substantive provision
that a consistent interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision would amply
promote this goal. The core substantive provision does not limit actionable
misconduct to '"economic' or 'tangible' discrimination" or to that which
affects the "'terms' and 'conditions' [of employment] in the narrow
contractual sense. 35 2 Instead, it reaches much farther, encompassing any
employer act that exposes a protected employee to "disadvantageous terms
or conditions of employment to which [employees outside the protected
class] are not exposed., 353  Granted, such conduct "must be extreme to
amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment," as Title
VII is not intended to operate as a "general civility code" and therefore
does not reach petty slights, minor annoyances, simple teasing, offhand
comments and other such insufficiently adverse treatment.354 However, the
Court has repeatedly upheld these limitations on what actions may support
a claim of discrimination against an employee based on his or her protected
trait (race, sex, religion, etc.). Surely, then, what is not sufficiently wrong
to afford an employee a remedy for discrimination based on his protected
trait is likewise insufficiently wrong to support a claim of discrimination
based on his protected conduct.
The Court in White disagrees, and suggests that because "[a]n
employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions
not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the
workplace," the scope of the anti-retaliation provision must be broader.355
However, the examples the Court provides here, which are discussed
above, fail to demonstrate that the anti-retaliation provision's goals cannot
be met by affording employees the same protection under it as under the
statute's core counterpart.356  Were the statute revised as I suggest, the
employee-plaintiffs in both cases cited by the Court would remain
protected.357 Moreover, White would remain protected too, at least as to
her suspension, which deprived her of income for an extended period of
time, thereby having an objective, material adverse effect on her
compensation. The slightly narrower protection I propose would still deter
the vast majority of retaliation against protected employees, but would not
352. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); see also supra Part III. (describing
Supreme Court precedents interpreting Title VII's core substantive provision).
353. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (6th Cir. 1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
354. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80).
355. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2412 (emphasis omitted).
356. See supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text.
357. Id.
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expand Title VII beyond the employment-centered bounds upon which it
was enacted.
Moreover, the proposed revision would better promote Title VII's
other statutory goals. First and foremost among these, as discussed above,
is the assurance of equality in the workplace.358 Equating the protection
afforded to employees who engage in protected activity with that afforded
to the minorities the statute exists to protect certainly does not hinder this
central legislative policy. Indeed, as the examples discussed above
demonstrate, affording broader protection under the anti-retaliation
provision than its substantive counterpart actually contravenes this goal by
causing employers to treat employees who engage in protected activity
more favorably than any others, including those who would otherwise
benefit from the statute's core provision.35 9 Thus, revising the statute as I
propose would cure this problem by equalizing the protection afforded
individuals in each of these groups.
My revision would also encourage employer forethought and promote
maintenance of management prerogatives. For instance, because case law
interpreting the core provision would apply equally to the anti-retaliation
provision, employers would be incentivized by the Court's holdings in
Ellerth and Faragher to implement and publicize policies strictly
prohibiting retaliation. The revision would also encourage an employer to
consider carefully any potentially adverse action it might take against an
employee who has engaged in protected activity, as the standard's objective
threshold would permit a well-intentioned employer to assess more
accurately whether its proposed action would be unlawful or not. Further,
employers would be freer to make decisions about how to run the
workplace within the confines of the law because their hands would not be
tied by an overbroad, vague, and highly subjective standard. The courts
charged with the statute's judicial administration would also benefit
similarly from this clearer, more objective standard. In addition, any
docket congestion that might result from potentially substantial collateral
litigation over personal traits as part of the courts' administration of
White's "subjective" standard would be avoided. The greater clarity and
objective threshold offered by the core provision's standard would prevail,
benefiting employers, employees, and courts alike.
358. See supra notes 292-305 and accompanying text.
359. Id.
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D. A Standard We Can All Live With: Practical Justifications for the
Proposed Statutory Revision
Finally, the proposed revision makes sense, practically speaking. The
subjective standard imposed by the Court in White leaves employers
guessing about how to treat employees who engage in protected activities,
requiring employers to conduct extensive fact-finding of some unspecified
scope before making any management decisions that might somehow
impact any protected employee.3 60 Its vagaries, reflected in the Court's
mysterious "well might dissuade" causation standard, cast further shadows
on the already wavering line between prohibited and permissible
conduct.361  The revised standard, however, avoids these pitfalls. It
implements the clearer objective-plus-subjective inquiry espoused by the
Court in cases like Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,362 and avoids entirely
the vague causation standard implemented in White. The statutory revision
I propose therefore offers greater clarity to employers and courts, while
continuing to protect employees who engage in protected activity to the
extent they deserve.
VII. CONCLUSION
The strict enforcement of Title VII necessary for maintenance of
equality in the workplace depends heavily upon complaints by and
information from employees, who come closer than most anyone else to
witnessing employer conduct firsthand. These employees, in turn, cannot
effectively aid the enforcement process without sufficient protection from
employer retaliation. The anti-retaliation provision offers this protection,
but because its language is not specific as to its intended scope, courts have
struggled to define clear standards of conduct by which employers could
then readily abide. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to offer some
much-needed clarity when it decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White in June 2006, but its efforts fell short of the task. The
standard announced by the Court in that case, while nominally objective,
injects substantial subjectivity into the adverse-action inquiry. Moreover,
the Court's discussion of its standard raises more questions than it answers,
leaving well-intentioned employers, potentially aggrieved employees, and
courts alike, without the direction they need to uphold the important goals
Title VII seeks to accomplish.
360. See supra Part V.B.
361. Id.
362. 510 U.S. 17 (1993); see also supra Part VI.B. (discussing greater clarity of
proposed standard).
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The problems the White decision creates are not without remedy,
though. Congress could step in to cure these problems by amending the
anti-retaliation provision to make clear that the same standards govern
there as under the statute's core anti-discrimination provision. While such
a revision might not resolve every ambiguity, as open questions remain
under the core provision's standard as well, it would nevertheless bring to
the table substantially greater clarity than the Court's vague and subjective
standard in White. Although only time will tell just how difficult the
Court's standard will be to administer, the continued enhancement of the
Title VII enforcement process is too important to wait. Congress should
step in now, and provide the executors of Title VII's equality-based will-
employers and courts-with the direction they need in order to better fulfill
their duties.
